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OUT OF REVERSE: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT LITIGATION AFTER CHRYSLER CORP. v. 
BROWN 
Judith A. Johnson * 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the Supreme Court granted certiorari! to Chrysler 
Corp. u. Brown,2 a case raising some of the major issues in "re-
verse" Freedom of Information ActS litigation. In a "reverse" 
Freedom of Information Act suit, the statute was used not as a 
means of gaining access to information, but as a mechanism for 
preventing disclosure of information claimed to be private or con-
fidential. The issues involved in these suits had first appeared in 
the courts in 19734 and had given rise to extensive litigation. II A 
grant of certiorari was appropriate, not only to resolve a split in 
authority in the circuit courts,S but also to resolve some of the 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 435 U.S. 914 (1978). 
• 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
• The Freedom of Information Act is codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). 
• COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS FOR 
BUSINESS DATA AND REVERSE-FOIA LAWSUITS, H.R. REP. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 HOUSE REPORT). 
• Citations to reverse FOIA lawsuits can be found throughout this article, in particular 
at notes 58 and 81. For an extensive compilation of reverse FOIA suits see Campbell, 
Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need for Congressional Action, 67 
GEO. L.J. 103 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Campbell). 
• Compare Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977), with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 
1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 
(1979); General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and 
remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); and 
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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fundamental tensions underlying reverse Freedom of Information 
Act litigation.7 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the major issues before 
the court in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,8 tracing their development 
prior to the decision and evaluating the Supreme Court's re-
sponse. To create a context in which to understand the issues, the 
article will first briefly review the background and legislative his-
tory of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).9 Next, the statu-
tory provisions will be described, with particular emphasis on the 
two exemptions involved in most reverse suits involving confiden-
tial business information. The typical patterns for direct and re-
verse suits under the FOIA will then be explained. After this pre-
liminary survey of the Act, the article will turn to the major 
issues that were presented in Chrysler: 
(1) the mandatory or permissive nature of the exemptions provided 
for in the FOIA; 
(2) the existence of a reverse cause of action under the FOIA; 
(3) the scope of Exemption Four of the FOIA; 
(4) the question of whether the Trade Secrets ActIO falls within the 
scope of Exemption Three of the FOIA; 
(5) the existence of an implied cause of action under the Trade 
Secrets Act; 
(6) the scope of information covered by the Trade Secrets Act; 
(7) the meaning of "authorization by law" under the Trade Secrets 
Act; and 
(8) the scope of judicial reviewll of agency decisions to disclose in-
formation pursuant to FOIA requests. 
Having developed the major issues arising in reverse FOIA suits, 
the article will evaluate the impact on reverse FOIA litigation of 
the Supreme Court's treatment of the dispute between Chrysler 
and the government. After a brief summary of the facts of the 
dispute, and of the major conclusions reached by the lower 
courts,12 the article will analyze the Supreme Court decision. In 
7 The existence of a fundamental tension underlying the FOIA was pointed out by 
Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Busi-
ness Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REv. 587, 
592 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Clement]. 
• 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
• 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). I. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). The Trade Secrets Act is commonly refered to as § 1905. 
II 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 
II Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976), vacated and remanded, 
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the first part of the analysis, the focus will be on those major, 
recurring questions for which the Court supplied answers; in the 
second part, the emphasis will be on those important issues not 
resolved, and on some answers that are needed for the future. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
A. Background 
As the federal bureaucracy expanded in the mid-20th century, 
and federal agencies proliferated, the government found itself in 
possession of a vast store of information.13 Some of this informa-
tion was generated by the government itself; much of it was ac-
quired from individuals and groups subject to regulation by the 
various agencies. Some of the data was submitted voluntarily;H 
other documents were submitted pursuant to regulations which 
conditioned the receipt of government benefits on compliance 
with government requests for information. 111 As the amount of 
data held by the government grew, the need for effective legisla-
tion providing public access to the information became clear. IS In-
dividuals and groups advanced valid reasons for desiring access to 
the government's store of information.17 Furthermore, public ac-
565 F.2d 1172 (3d. Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
13 Petitioner's Brief at 9-10, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
• 4Id . 
•• Reverse FOIA cases reveal a number of different situations in which government 
agencies requested documents from private businesses. In one influential case, the Na-
tional Park Service required concessionaires operating in national parks to submit detailed 
financial information on a continuing basis. See National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In several cases, health care providers in Medicaid 
and Medicare programs were required to submit billing information to the Secretary of 
HEW to enable the staff to determine whether monthly payments made by Blue Cross 
were proper. See Doctors Hosp. of Sarasota, Inc. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 476 (M.D. Fla. 
1978); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979). The 
Chrysler case was one of several in which employment information was submitted by busi-
nesses in order to receive government contracts. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 
(1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) . 
• 8 Comment, "Reversing" the Freedom of Information Act: Congressional Intention or 
Judicial Invention, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 734, 734 (1977) . 
• 7 In one situation, access to certain pieces of information enabled contractors to dis-
cover mistakes in contract awards distributed by the General Services Administration. 
1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10. In another case, a trade publication used the 
FOIA to inform firms of agency actions involving inspection of pharmaceutical firms. Id. at 
11. On another occasion, a non-profit corporation sought access to a film in order to inform 
citizens of the incidental killing of dolphins by the purse seine nets used in tuna fishing. 
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cess to the information was essential to avoid the dangers of a 
government conducted in secrecy-or a government perceived to 
be operating in secrecy. The vision of administrative agencies 
controlling large amounts of secret information was antithetical 
to the ideal of a democratic government. IS 
On the other hand, in some situations the government, or the 
party who had submitted the information to the government, had 
a vested interest in keeping the data confidential. 19 Allowing pub-
lic access to such information could easily undermine legitimate 
government interests20 or produce economic and personal injury 
to those who had given information to their government in confi-
dence.21 While it is true that most citizens consider abhorrent a 
government conducted in secrecy, many would also be surprised 
and offended by the notion that information they consider private 
or proprietary22 could be obtained and subsequently disseminated 
through the medium of a government agency.1S 
Save the Dolphins v. Department of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
,. Senator Edward Kennedy, sponsor of the 1974 Senate bill to amend the FOIA (S. 
2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)) voiced this sentiment: "If the people of a democratic 
nation do not know what decisions their government is making, do not know the basis on 
which those decisions are being made, then their rights as a free people may gradually slip 
away, silently stolen when decisions which affect their lives are made under the cover of 
secrecy." S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in Campbell, supra note 
5, at 106. 
,. A business which had developed a new product would have a significant financial 
interest in keeping such a development secret. O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of Private 
Secrets under the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. L. 1125, 1125 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as O'Reilly]. Similarly, the CIA, for example, might claim that information in its 
possession must be kept confidential to protect the national security. Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. 
Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1977). 
'0 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-84 (1973) . 
.. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
• , The term "proprietary" describes something which belongs, by right, to an owner; the 
owner, or proprietor, has an exclusive right to it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (5th ed. 
1979) . 
• s Submitters expressed this concept of the proprietary nature of certain confidential 
business information in a variety of contexts. At the 1977 Oversight Hearings on the 
FOIA, various business leaders and groups expressed dismay over the disclosure of private 
information under the FOIA. See Business Records Exemption of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 162 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Oversight Hearings]. The Senate and 
House reports accompanying the FOIA also reflected this belief in the confidentiality of 
certain information. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); and H.R. REP. No. 
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2418, 2422-23. In its brief to the Supreme Court, Chrysler pointed to the nation's patent, 
copyright, and trade secret laws as support for the concept of the private, proprietary 
nature of business information. See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Chrysler Corp. V. Brown, 441 
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The basis for conflict thus has long been clear. However, a plan 
for balancing the conflicting interests has proven to be difficult to 
construct. One of the major pieces of legislation designed to con-
front the problem was the Freedom of Information Act. 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)14 was "sweeping" leg-
islation,11I broadly framed to effectuate a major public policy: 
public access to information in the hands of the government." 
The FOIA was enacted in 196617 to replace the rather ineffective 
disclosure provisions28 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).18 At that time, legislators emphasized that the FOIA was 
to effectuate the "fullest responsible disclosure."8o It was to make 
available information which would enable the electorate to make 
well-informed and well-reasoned choices, and to insist on govern-
ment accountability.81 On the other hand, Congress also perceived 
right from the beginning that the law would come into conflict 
with equally basic principles of privacy and confidentiality. In 
both houses, legislators stressed the need to balance interests 
favoring disclosure with those protecting confidentiality.81 
The initial results of the FOIA were disappointing, for the free 
flow of information that had been anticipated did not material-
ize." When the House reported on the workings of the FOIA in 
1972, reference was made to "five years of foot-dragging by the 
Federal bureaucracy."84 
U.S. 281 (1979). See generally Patten & Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under 
the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 AD. L. REv. 193 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Patten & Weinstein] . 
.. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) . 
•• Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 238 (M.D. Fla. 1979) . 
•• EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) . 
•• Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) . 
• e EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). 
8. S. REp. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) . 
• , One expression of this view can be found in the Foreword to the [1967] ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT, reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263 (1968): "If government is to be truly of, 
by, and for the people, the people must know in detail the activities of government. Noth-
ing so diminishes democracy as secrecy." Id. at 264 . 
.. S. REp. No. 813, 89th Congo 1st Sess. 3 (1965), and H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Congo 2d 
Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2423 . 
• s Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 48 TEx. L. REv. 1261, 1262 (1970) . 
.. H.R. REp. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), cited in Campbell, supra note 5, at 
105. 
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In response to the lack of effectiveness of the FOIA,36 Congress 
amended the statute in 1974.36 The amendments were designed to 
encourage agency compliance with the FOIA37 by establishing 
strict administrative procedures and providing for penalties for 
any arbitrary failure to disclose.38 The congressional action "re-
store[d] the strength drained from the 1966 Act by seven years of 
agency misuse .... "39 After the 1974 amendments, in light of 
the penalties for wrongful withholding, agencies became more 
likely to comply with information requests"o Further amendment 
of the FOIA in 197641 was designed to encourage greater disclo-
sure of information by limiting the amount of information which 
was "exempt" from the statute's disclosure provisions,,2 
In sum, Congress enacted the FOIA to provide greater public 
access to information in the hands of the government, while not 
totally eliminating protection for confidential material. As Con-
gress amended the FOIA, the trend toward greater disclosure 
continued. 
B. Statutory Provisions of the Amended FOIA 
The major goal of providing increased access to information is 
presently exemplified by the first part of the amended Freedom 
of Information Act,,3 Under this part of the statute, each agency 
is required to publish, in the Federal Register, a description of its 
organization, functioning, rules of procedure, and substantive 
rules of general applicability.44 Agencies are also required to make 
other pieces of information available for copying, including final 
•• H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6267, 6270-71 . 
•• Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974). 
37 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 3A.1 at 52 (1976). 
3. Clement, supra note 7 at 597. 
S. Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 958 (1975) . 
•• Clement, supra note 7, at 589 n.6 . 
.. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247· (1976) . 
•• The 1976 amendment was, in part, a response to the generous interpretation afforded 
Exemption Three of the FOIA in FAA V. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975). H.R. REP. No. 
880 pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 
2183, 2204-05; H. CONF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 2244, 2260-61. One final, minor amendment was made in 
1978. Act of Oct. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, Title IX, § 906(a)(10), 92 Stat. 1225 (1978) . 
.. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) . 
•• Id. § 552(a)(1)(A)-(1)(D). 
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opinions of the agency and statements of policy.411 Most important 
. is the requirement that agencies comply with information re-
quests from the public, provided that the requests reasonably de-
scribe the data being sought and are made in accordance with 
published rules of procedure.48 These minimum requirements for 
. making FOIA requests are significantly less stringent than those 
in the preceding disclosure provisions of the APA,47 and are in-
tended to simplify and expedite public access to information.48 
To further encourage prompt disclosure, the FOIA requires 
each agency to respond to a request for information within ten 
days49 and to respond to an appeal from an agency denial of a 
request within twenty days.IIO Furthermore, if a requester61 is dis-
satisfied with an agency determination, it can seek judicial review 
in district court where it is entitled to de novo consideration by 
the court. IS The district court is empowered to enjoin the agency 
from withholding records and to order production of any records 
improperly withheld.68 Finally, the FOIA directs possible sanc-
tions against government officials who arbitrarily withhold infor-
mation that should be disclosed.1I4 
As has been noted, the commitment to public. access to infor-
mation was balanced by a reluctance to abandon traditional no-
tions of privacy and confidentiality. These privacy interests were 
generally embodied in the nine exemptions found in the second 
part of the statute. III 
The nine exemptions establish certain categories of information 
to which the first part of the FOIA-the disclosure section-does 
•• [d. § 552(a)(2)(A)-(2)(B) 
•• [d. § 552(a)(3) 
•• As the Supreme Court noted, the FOIA stood in "sharp relief' to § 3 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238 (1946), formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002), and elim-
inated the requirement that requesters be properly concerned with the information 
sought. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) . 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2418-19 . 
•• 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). 
10 [d. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). 
.. The term "requester" -referring to a party that requests information from the gov-
ernment under the provisions of the FOIA-is part of the jargon accompanying reverse 
FOIA litigation. Since the term is commonly used and easily understood, it will be used 
throughout this article . 
•• 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) . 
•• [d. § 552(a)(4)(B) . 
.. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (West Supp. 1979) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
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not apply;" that is, the information in the second part of the Act 
is "exempt" from the directives of the first part. These categories 
include, generally: (1) information ordered to be kept secret by 
the executive branch; (2) internal personnel matters of each 
agency; (3) information specifically exempted from disclosure by 
statute; (4) trade secrets and privileged or confidential commer-
cial and financial information; (5) inter- or intra-agency memo-
randa not· available to a party other than an agency in litigation 
with an agency; (6) private personnel and medical files; (7) certain 
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (8) 
certain information in reports concerning financial institutions; 
and (9) geological and geophysical information concerning wells.17 
Two of the exemptions, numbers three and four, became particu-
larly important to businesses which sought to protect confidential 
information submitted to the government." . 
Exemption Three originally provided that information would 
not have to be disclosed under the FOIA if such information was 
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. "19 In enacting 
Exemption Three, Congress seemed to be responding to concerns 
that the FOIA would repeal, by implication, over 100 non-disclo-
sure statutes already in existenceSO and so eliminate existing pro-
tection for private and proprietary information. This initial ver-
sion of Exemption Three could be interpreted to apply to a 
number of non-disclosure statutes,S1 and Congress eventually be-
•• Id. § 552(b) . 
•• Id. § 552(b)(I)-(b)(9) . 
.. See, e.g., the following cases involving Exemption Three and Exemption Four: Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded Bub nom. 
Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979) (Exemption Three); General Dynam-
ics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 
(1979) (both); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Admin. 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (both); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (both); Westchester Gen. H08p., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 
236 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (both); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736 
(D. Md. 1978) (Exemption Three); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. 
Supp. 744 (D. Md. 1976) (Exemption Three); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 
F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Exemption Three); Pharmaceutical Mfga. Ass'n v. Wein-
berger, 401 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1975), modified, 411 F. Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1976) (both) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970) . 
.., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Congo 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2427 . 
• , See, e.g., FAA V. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975) (§ 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act 
of 1958); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. V. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (18 U.S.C. § 1905); Metropolitan Life Ins. CO. V. Usery, 426 F. 
Supp. 150 (D. D.C. 1976), cert. before judgment denied, Bub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
1979] REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION 307 
came dissatisfied with its potentially broad reach.82 In an attempt 
to circumscribe the scope of Exemption Three, Congress added, 
by amendment,88 certain criteria which a statute must meet 
before it can be classified an Exemption Three statute: the stat-
ute must (A) require that matters be withheld in such a way as to 
leave no discretion on the issue or (B) establish particular criteria 
for withholding or refer to particular types of matters to be with-
held." Whether or not certain statutes met these new criteria be-
came the subject of continued controversy.8a 
Exemption Four also aroused substantial controversy." This 
provision exempts from the FOIA disclosure provisions certain in-
formation that is "trade secret" or "commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."8? 
Businesses relied on this exemption to provide protection for con-
fidential business data. Interpretation of the scope of this exemp-
tion came into issue immediately88 and continued to be of major 
significance in litigation involving the FOIA.89 
c. Litigation Under the FOIA 
1. The Direct Suit 
Congress anticipated that a certain kind of litigation would 
arise under the FOIA and established specific procedures whereby 
a requester could challenge an agency decision to withhold infor-
mation.70 The "model" direct suit under the FOIA would unfold 
according to the following pattern. First, a member of the public 
would request information from the agency, pursuant to valid 
America v. Nat'l Org. of Women, D.C. Chapter, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
8(e)(1970) & 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1970» . 
•• See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2244, 2260-61. 
•• Government in The Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). 
•• See cases cited in note 58, supra. 
•• See cases cited in note 58, supra. Other cases dealing with Exemption Four include: 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n V. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Charles 
River Park "A", Inc. V. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); National Parks & Conserva-
tion Ass'n V. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); General Services Admin. V. Benson, 
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); M.A. Schapiro & CO. V. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976) . 
.. See, e.g., General Services Admin. V. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); M.A. 
Schapiro & CO. V. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972) . 
•• See cases cited in note 58, supra, and text at notes 145-69, 322-52, infra . 
•• 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(4)(D) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). 
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procedures established under the FOIA.71 The agency would re-
spond negatively, within ten days, setting forth the reasons for its 
decision and the right of the requester to appeal to the head of 
the agency.72 The requester would appeal the decision to the 
agency head and, within twenty days, receive another unfavorable 
response along with notice of the right to judicial review." The 
requester would then file a complaint in district court,"4 request-
ing expedited review.'7& Considering the matter de novo,'" and 
perhaps examining the requested documents in camera,"" the 
court would either uphold the agency decision, or direct the 
agency to disclose some or all of the records. "8 Traditional judicial 
procedures would then be available for appealing the district 
court's decision."8 
2. The Reverse Suit 
Congress apparently did not anticipate80 that another type of 
suit would arise under the FOIA, the so-called "reverse" FOIA 
suit.81 In this type of litigation, a party that had submitted infor-
mation would attempt to use the FOIA "in reverse"- that is, to 
use it to protect information from disclosure. The problems 
raised by such a suit were complex and included, among others, 
issues of jurisdiction and venue,81 cause of action,83 and scope of 
71 [d. § 552(a)(3), (4)(A). 
7' [d. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 
7' [d. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). 
7. [d. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
7. [d. § 552(a)(4)(D). 
7. [d. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
77 [d. § 552(a)(4)(B). See, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845 
(D. Conn. 1979). 
7. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). 
7. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park "An, Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) . 
•• See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 54-55 . 
• , Numerous reverse suits were litigated between 1973 and the 1979 decision in Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See the text generally. Some of the most well-known 
reverse suits are: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979); General 
Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 441 
U.S. 919 (1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d. 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park "An, Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). 
•• An incisive analysis of the problems of jurisdiction and venue appears in Campbell, 
supra note 5, at 160-191. 
1979] REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION 309 
review.8• However, although the problems involved were complex 
and the possible fact patterns numerous, a certain typical 
"model" also evolved for the reverse FOIA suit involving confi-
dential business information. 
First of all, the submitter811 would become aware that certain 
information it had provided to the government was about to be 
disclosed to a third party.8S If the submitter objected to such dis-
closure, it would attempt to convince the agency to turn down the 
request. If the submitter failed to convince the agency, or if the 
submitter concluded that there was not sufficient time to present 
its arguments to the agency within the time limits of the FOIA,87 
it would turn to the courts to prevent disclosure. Submitters 
would argue that the material sought by the requester was ex-
empt from disclosure under one of the exemptions to the FOIA, 
frequently the fourth-trade secret-exemption.88 Alternatively, 
submitters would contend that disclosure was prohibited by a 
statute that fell within Exemption Three of the FOIA.89 A statute 
commonly relied on in this context was the Trade Secrets Act. 110 
Submitters also attempted to use the Trade Secrets Act indepen-
dently of the FOIA as an alternative basis for court review. They 
argued that the Trade Secrets Act gave them an implied right of 
action to challenge agency decisions to disclose trade secret infor-
mation.1I1 Finally, submitters also used the APA as a source of 
.S See text at notes 136-43, 175-81, 205-10, infra . 
•• See text at notes 211-21, infra. 
•• The term "submitter" - referring to parties who have submitted to the government 
information which may become the subject of an FOIA request - is also part of the jargon 
accompanying reverse FOIA litigation. Since it is commonly used and easily understood, it 
will be used throughout this article. I. The FOIA itself does not require agencies to notify submitters of plans to release 
information pursuant to an FOIA request. As a result, agency practices vary. Agencies may 
notify submitters as a matter of informal practice or pursuant to agency regulations. 
Campbell, supra note 5, at 133-36. 
87 This problem materialized in the controversy between Chrysler and the government. 
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
•• 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976) . 
•• [d. § 552(b)(3) . 
•• 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). 
11 Their arguments on this point met with limited success in the courts. The District 
Court of the District of Columbia granted a permanent injunction to plaintiffs in a reverse 
FOIA suit, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1905. Citing Wyandotte v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 
202 (1967), the court reasoned that plaintiffs had standing to invoke the criminal statute 
to effectuate the congressional purpose. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. 
Supp. 212, 213 n.2 (D.D.C. 1973). However, when the court of appeals remanded the case 
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jurisdiction for suits challenging agency decisions to disclose.92 
The first reverse suit was filed in 1973;93 in 1976, seventy-six 
cases were filed, and in 1978, when the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations issued its report on the fourth exemption of 
FOIA, 104 cases were pending"· The reasons for the growth of 
reverse FOIA litigation were complex. 
According to one attorney who has litigated major reverse 
FOIA suits, the growth was due, at least in part, to "a profound 
change in the purposes for which FOIA requests are being 
made."91i The FOIA was designed to enable the public to learn 
about its government, but had become "a vehicle for surveillance, 
at public expense, of the private affairs of commercial enterprises 
by their adversaries."98 Not only had the purposes of requesters 
changed but, according to testimony at Congressional hearings on 
Exemption Four, the courts seem to have deviated from Congres-
sional intent regarding Exemption Four,,7 
In addition to criticisms asserted by interested parties, other 
criticisms of the treatment of confidential business information 
under the FOIA were articulated by legal commentators, mem-
bers of Congress, and the courts. These criticisms concerned the 
adequacy of agency procedures for protecting private business in-
terests. Specifically, dismay was expressed at the lack of notice of 
impending disclosure given to submitters,98 the lack of time and 
for further proceedings, it indicated that review should be based on the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and that §1905 should function simply as a check on agency discretion. 
Charles River Park "A", v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Another district 
court also intimated that submitters might have an implied right of action under §1905. In 
ordering hearings on the issue of substantial harm, the district court in Burroughs Corp. v. 
Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975), did not rule out the possibility of an im-
plied right of action under §1905. Although the court recognized that jurisdiction was 
proper under portions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§702, 706, 706(2), it also stated that, since 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin violation of §1905, jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. §1331. 
Id. at 636. Contra, General Dynamics v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated 
and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th 
Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 
(1979); Westchester Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979) . 
•• See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976); McCoy 
v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974) . 
•• 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 54 . 
•• Id . 
•• Statement by Burt A. Brauerman, 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 23, at 
108 . 
.. Id . 
• 7 Id. at 113-14 . 
•• 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
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opportunity for submitters to present fully their objections to the 
release of information,99 the lack of interest on the part of the 
agency in protecting submitters' rights,lOO and the impracticality 
and expense of filing a reverse suit.10l These concerns were rein-
forced by a recognition of the possibility of serious financial loss 
on the part of both the submitter and the consuming public, lOS 
and by a sense of unfairness at the way the Act affected legiti-
mate business interests. loa 
The growth of this reverse FOIA litigation should not have 
been surprising, nor was it a wholly undesirable result of the leg-
islation. The FOIA incorporated tensions basic to society: it re-
flected strongly held beliefs in democratic principles and in theo-
ries of economic competitiveness. For the Act to be faithful to 
those competing interests, it had to strike a delicate balance. As 
the factors that were to be considered were given different weight 
by society, and as new factors entered into the balancing process, 
there had to be a forum for re-establishing equilibrium. Once cer-
tain problems had been exposed and debated, and the major 
questions crystallized, there arose a need for judicial resolution of 
recurring legal issues, as well as for legislative attention to recur-
ring procedural problems within the Act itself. 
III. MAJOR ISSUES IN REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION PRIOR TO THE 
DECISION IN CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN 
As reverse FOIA suits involving the business records exemp-
tionl04 became more numerous, certain recurring issues crystal-
lized and the arguments relating to these issues became formal-
ized. Most of these established issues were presented by the 
controversy between Chrysler Corporation and the government. 
To appreciate the effect of the final decision in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown,lO& it is useful to examine the issues as they stood before 
the Supreme Court handed down its decision. 
00 Clement, supra note 7, at 634-35. 
,.. Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 202-03. 
,., Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 194. 
,., O'Reilly, supra note 19, at 1146. 
,., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210-15 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
, •• See text at notes 80-103, supra. 
,., 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
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A. The Permissive or Mandatory Nature of the FOIA 
Exemptions 
One of the' threshold issues raised in reverse suits was whether 
the nine statutory exemptions to the FOIA 108 provided absolute 
protection for information within their scope, or whether they 
simply allowed the agencies to exercise discretion in determining 
whether or not to disclose such material pursuant to an FOIA 
request. 
The significance of the determination was clear: if the exemp-
tions were mandatory, they would provide a more potent tool for 
submitters to use in blocking disclosure. The. main battle would 
be over whether requested material fell into one of the nine cate-
gories; if so, the discussion would be at an end and agencies would 
have to withhold the information. On the other hand, if the ex-
emptions were permissive, the battle would take place on two 
fronts: (1) Did the requested information fall into an exempt cat-
egory? (2) If so, should the agency, in using its discretion, decide 
to release the information anyway? The standards the agency ap-
plied to discretionary disclosure would then be crucial. Questions 
would arise as to how much weight should be given to various 
factors such as the public good, the particular agency's mission, 
and the interests of the submitting party. In attempting to re-
solve the dilemma over whether the exemptions were mandatory 
or permissive, courts and commentators considered the words of 
the statute,107 legislative history,t°8 the interests to be balancedl09 
and, eventually, a growing number of court decisions. no 
The proponents of the theory that the exemptions should be 
construed as mandatory found some support in statutory lan-
guage.111 Although the words of the exemption provisions are not 
unambiguous, an argument could be made that they point to a 
mandatory construction. For example, the exemption section be-
gins with the following phrase: "This section [the disclosure pro-
106 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)-(b)(9) (1976). See text at notes 56-57,supra. 
107 Campbell, supra note 5, at 132. 
108 See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
108 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210-11 (4th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). See also Project, Government Information and the 
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1045-46 (1975). 
110 In reaching a decision in 1979, a Florida district court cited extensively to previous 
judicial opinions resulting from reverse FOIA litigation. See Westchester Gen. Hosp. Inc. 
v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 239 (M.D. Fla. 1979). 
III 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
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vision] does not apply to matters that are .... "112 This phrase 
makes it clear that the provisions of the FOIA requiring disclo-
sure do not apply to exempt material: agencies are not directed to 
provide access to exempt material. From this language it could 
be inferred that exempt material should not be disclosed.1l8 
Legislative history could also be read to favor a mandatory view 
of the exemptions. For example, Housell4 and Senatelll reports 
accompanying the FOIA made it clear that access to information 
was not the sole aim of the Act; rather, the goal was to achieve as 
much access as possible while protecting other legitimate inter-
ests.ll8 To achieve this dual goal, Congress arguably protected 
certain information as a matter of right and not as a matter or 
discretion.ll7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was 
persuaded by this argument that Congress intended to protect 
completely the confidentiality of certain privately submitted 
data.l18 The court found that Exemption Four contained "an ex-
press affirmation of a legislative policy favoring confidentiality of 
private information furnished government agencies, the disclo-
sure of which might be harmful to private interests. "11e 
While not specifically relied on by the court, some of the 
strongest arguments advanced on behalf of the submitters who 
argued for mandatory exemptions were based on practical 
considerations. 
111 [d. (Emphasis added) 
111 Further support for this view could also be found later in the statute. After listing 
the exceptions, the FOIA provides that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record 
shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions 
which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). (Emphasis added). 
This provision seemed to assume that the agency would delete; and thus withhold, exempt 
material. 
114 H.R. REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966), reprinted in (1966) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2418, 2427. 
111 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). 
110 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. V. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210-11 (4th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
117 See National Parks and Conservation Ass'n V. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768-70 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), discussing the Hearings on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 
(1964). Senate bill 1666 was the predecessor of the FOIA; the fact that it contained no 
exemption for trade secrets aroused substantial controversy. After the hearings, it was 
amended to include a trade secrets exemption similar to the one finally enacted as part of 
the FOIA. [d. 
Il8 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. V. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
"8 [d. (emphasis in original). 
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First, businesses contended that agencies sometimes lacked the 
expertise called for in determining whether or not to release busi-
ness information. lllo Agencies could not be knowledgeable about 
every kind of business that sought to protect its data and could 
not be expected to make sound decisions about the consequences 
of releasing complex commercial and financial information. III 
Second, agencies were criticized for lacking commitment to the 
submitter's point of view.u2 Threatened with sanctions if they 
unlawfully withheld information, agencies allegedly had little in-
centive to argue for the submitter's cause.123 Third, business in-
terests argued that they would be more likely to submit informa-
tion to the government if they could depend' on an assurance of 
confidentiality. Ill. While it was true that businesses were often re-
quired to submit data, it was argued that more and better infor-
mation would be provided if the exemptions were mandatory. 121 
Fourth, there was evidence that the FOIA was being used by 
some businesses to gain information about their competitors.u8 
The amount of economic harm caused was disputable, but per-
haps both private businesses and their customers were paying a 
price for public access to information. Ill? 
Despite these practical concerns which favored a mandatory 
construction of the exemptions, and which should be addressed in 
any proposed solutions to FOIA problems, the arguments raised 
in favor of interpreting the exemptions as permissive were per-
suasive. The language of the FOIA did not direct agencies to 
withhold information.u8 The exemptions simply set out catego-
ries of information to which the disclosure regulations did not ap-
ply. The exemptions authorized withholding, but did not man-
date it. 
The Act's legislative history offered support for holding the ex-
emptions to be permissive.129 Furthermore, even if the original 
U. Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 203. 
m Petitioner's Brief at 76-77, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
... Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 202-03. 
u'Id. 
u. Petitioner's Brief at 32, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
... Id. at 29 . 
... Id. at 21-22. 
U7 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-11. 
lO. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
... The House and Senate reports cited by proponents of a mandatory interpretation of 
the amendments could also be interpreted as lending support to the' opposite point of 
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congressional intent was not unambiguous, subsequent actions by 
Congress clarified legislative perceptions of the FOIA. In 1972, 
the House Committee on Government Operations held oversight 
hearings on agency compliance with the FOIA. Noting a lack of 
compliance on the part of agencies, the committee stated emphat-
ically that the "withholding of information by government under 
the Act is permissive, not mandatory."13o The legislative history 
of the 1974 amendments131 clarified the legislative preference for 
the permissive view. 132 
Outside of the Fourth Circuit,133 judicial interpretation of the 
FOIA exemptions favored a permissive construction. 134 Some 
courts reached the point of simply stating the conclusion that the 
exemptions were permissive, without exploring the issue in de-
tail. 1311 It remained for the Supreme Court in Chrysler to finally 
determine whether arguments for a permissive interpretation 
completely outweighed the not unreasonable claims of submitters 
for guaranteed protection of exempt information. 
B. The "Reverse" Suit: the Existence of a Right of Action for 
Submitters Under the FOIA 
A Supreme Court decision on whether or not the FOIA exemp-
tions were mandatory would help resolve another contested issue: 
could submitters "reverse" the Act and use it to seek an injunc-
tion against disclosure? Although the FOIA itself set out specific 
procedures for court review of an agency's refusal to disclose in-
formation sought by a third party,136 no corresponding rights were 
delineated for a submitter who wished to block disclosure of ex-
empt material. A decision that the exemptions were mandatory 
would help the submitters in arguing for an implied right of ac-
view. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 3, and H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 23, at 10, 
both contained language which could be construed as supporting the permissive view. 
130 H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972), cited in Clement, supra note 7 at 
599. 
131 Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974). 
132 Campbell, supra note 5, at 133 . 
.. 3 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
431 V.S. 924 (1977) . 
.. < Clement, supra note 7, at 600 . 
... Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 239 (M.D. Fla. 1979) . 
.. 6 5 V.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(4)(G) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). See text at notes 70-77, 
supra. 
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tion.137 If the FOIA prohibited disclosu~e of exempt material, any 
release of such information by the agency would constitute a stat-
utory violation.138 The existence of a potential violation could ar-
guably give rise to a right of action to enjoin agency disclosure. 
According to this view, congressional intent to protect submitters' 
interests supported the finding of an implied right of action.13. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enthusiastically 
endorsed finding this implied right of action in the FOIA.1fO Per-
haps influenced more by what it perceived to be the reality of the 
FOIA than by its perception of the intent of Congress, the court 
found that the FOIA protected private parties from disclosure 
and thus carried with it an implied right to invoke the equity 
power of the court:w "The envious competitor or the curious 
busybody demanding access to that private information has the 
right to such a de novo trial. . . . But is not the same right to be 
implied, when the supplier . . . seeks what may be regarded as 
correlative relief'?"ull Although the Fourth Circuit answered the 
question affirmatively, a larger number of courts did not,143 and 
submitters remained uncertain about whether a "reverse" suit 
could be brought under the FOIA. The issue was ready for a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court. 
187 The FOIA sets up certain standards of conduct; it also provides that if these stan-
dards are violated, certain parties, namely requesters, may seek to remedy such violations 
by bringing suit in federal court. No such right of action is specified for submitters. How-
ever, courts had been willing, in certain circumstances, to imply a right of action under 
statutes which did not expressly provide one. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of New 
York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967). At least one court was willing to accept the argu-
ment that since the FOIA was partially designed to protect submitters' interests, and since 
it specifically exempted some information from disclosure, the courts should imply a right 
of action for submitters to go to federal court and enjoin disclosure of exempt material. 
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210-12 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
118 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225, 1230-31 (E.n. Va. 1977), 
following the decision in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1209-10 
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
188 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1210-14 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
14. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 924, 1210 (1977). 
,., [d. at 1211. 
, •• [d. at 1213. 
,.. Clement, supra note 7 at 600. 
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c. The Scope of Exemption Four 
Since the main ground on which to contest disclosure of infor-
mation was that such information was "exempt,"U4 it was neces-
sary to determine the scope of the individual exemptions. An is-
sue with which the courts grappled early in reverse FOIA 
litigation involving business records was the scope of Exemption 
Four.ul! As was true of the whole FOIA itself, the exemption re-
lating to business records gained meaning as it was interpreted by 
the executive branch, Congress, and the courts. 
The interpretive process began when the Attorney General ex-
pressed doubts about the grammatical structure of the exemption 
and consequently about its coverage. us This doubt was quickly 
resolved in favor of an interpretation which held that the exemp-
tion covered two kinds of information: (1) trade secrets and (2) 
information which is commercial or financial, is obtained from a 
person, and is privileged or confidential.147 
The first category did not arouse much controversy, perhaps 
because definitions of "trade secret" were already available and 
could be modified as courts gained experience with the FOIA.I48 
Several cases involving the Freedom of Information Act discussed 
the meaning of "trade secret," and trade secret protection was 
provided in several instances under the FOIA.I48 
Establishing the parameters of the second category of Exemp-
tion Four data-commercial and financial information, privileged 
or confidential-was more difficult. One of the first approaches 
used to delineate the outlines of this category was the "promise of 
... See text at note 88, supra. 
U. "This section does not apply to matters that are ... (4) trade secrets and commer-
cial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential .... " 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 
U. [1967] Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the 
Administration Procedure Act, reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263, 300 (1968). 
147 National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
U. See Note, Would Macy's Tell Gimbel's: Government-Controlled·Business Informa-
tion and the Freedom Information Act, Forwards and Backwards, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 594, 
598-99 (1975). The initial choice seemed to be the definition set forth in RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); however, the Restatement definition was broad enough to 
encompass information in the second category, and a more limited definition seemed ap-
propriate. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 15-16. 
u. For example, one plaintiff argued that detailed information about natural gas 
reserves, obtained at great cost and released at economic peril, qualified as a trade secret. 
Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1976). For a similar trade secrets 
claim made by a plaintiff, see also Continental Oil v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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confidentiality" test. lllO This test took the rather simple view that 
if a person had submitted commercial or financial information to 
the government because an agency had offered an express or im-
plied promise of confidentiality, such information should be con-
sidered confidential under Exemption Four.1II1 Closely related to 
the "promise of confidentiality" test was the "expectation of con-
fidentiality" test;1III under this formulation, information that 
would not ordinarily be disclosed by a reasonable business enter-
prise would be protected under Exemption Four. lllS 
The drawbacks of these early tests were clear. Under the sub-
jective "promise of confidentiality" test, discretion regarding dis-
closure was left in the hands of the individual agencies and no 
standards were provided for deciding when a promise should be 
made.1II4 Excessive withholding was likely to be the result. 11111 Fur-
thermore, the test did not take into account situations in which 
the issue of confidentiality had not even been initially consid-
ered. llls Of the two versions, the more objective "expectation of 
confidentiality" test was better, m since courts could at least de-
termine whether the information in question was the kind of data 
a reasonable business would ordinarily reveal to the public. How-
ever, even this test allowed the criteria for disclosure to be set 
largely by business practice rather than by any test related to the 
public good.1II8 
As courts continued to apply Exemption Four, it became clear 
that a more objective test was needed to determine the scope of 
the exemption. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
responded to this need in the influential case of National Parks & 
.. 0 This approach was suggested by language in a House Report on the FOIA. 
"[Exemption Four] would also include information which is given to an agency in confi-
dence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the 
Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or infom18tion 
which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations." 
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONGo &: 
AD. NEWS, 2418, 2427. An early case utilizing this approach was General Services Admin. 
V. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969). 
III 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 16-17. 
"" [d. at 17. 
'" [d. at 17-18. 
1 .. [d. at 17. 
III [d. 
, .. [d . 
... [d. 
1 .. [d. at 18. 
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Conservation Association v. Morton. 1I19 Appellants had brought 
suit when officials of the Department of the Interior had refused 
to make public certain financial information about concessions 
which were operated in the national parks. In attempting to re-
solve the issue of whether such information was confidential, and 
protected by Exemption Four, the court reasoned that it was not 
sufficient that information would not customarily be released by 
the submitter; "[a] court must also be satisfied that non-disclo-
sure is justified by the legislative purpose which underlies the ex-
emption. "180 According to the court, the exemptions generally 
served two purposes: the government's interest in maintaining ef-
ficient operations and the submitter's interest in supplying infor-
mation in confidence.18l Supporting this view with numerous quo-
tations from legislative history, the court noted that Exemption 
Four, in particular, was justified by the need to encourage volun-
tary cooperation with the government and by the need to protect 
the rights of those who were compelled to provide data. IS. In 
summing up the rationale for its decision, the court created the 
National Parks test-commercial or financial information was 
confidential for purposes of Exemption Four if disclosure was 
likely either to impair the government's ability to obtain neces-
sary information in the future or to cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person from whom the information 
was obtained.183 
In applying the National Parks test, the courts clarified the 
scope of Exemption Four and grappled with difficult issues of 
proof. IS. One court refused a submitter's request for Exemption 
••• 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) . 
• 8. Id. at 767 . 
• 8. Id . 
• 8' Id. at 769 . 
• 8. Id. at 770 . 
• 8. Proof of competitive harm need not reach the level of proof required in elaborate 
anti-trust proceedings. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 681 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). In fact, once the plaintiffs showed the existence of competition, "No ac-
tual adverse effect on compeitition need be shown, nor could it be, for the requested docu-
ments have not been released." Id. at 683. Instead, the court would determine whether 
substantial competitive harm was threatened by looking at the nature of the material 
sought and the competitive circumstances of the business, relying to some extent on opin-
ion testimony. Id. In reverse FOIA cases arising under Exemption Four, submitters fre-
quently relied on expert testimony to show exactly how the information could be used by 
competitors to the disadvantage of the submitting corporation. See, e.g., Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
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Four protection where it believed the submitter was worried more 
about potential embarrassment than about potential competitive 
harm. lsll It also found that the fact that the submitter corporation 
had made its information available to others worked against a 
finding of harm under Exemption Four.lss In another case, the 
disclosure of summary data which only conveyed a vague idea of 
the composition of a company's work force was found not to offer 
material aid to a competitor.ls7 Further, although the courts con-
sidered whether or not information was submitted in confidence, 
this factor in itself was held not to bar disclosure unless the infor-
mation was also likely to cause competitive harm under the Na-
tional Parks test.IS8 
At the time of the Chrysler controversy, the National Parks 
test seemed firmly established as a method of determining the 
scope of Exemption Four. However, the test had been criticized 
as being too narrow to adequately protect submitters' interest.ls11 
A decision to return to earlier tests, or to extend the parameters 
of Exemption Four, would significantly alter the outcome of re-
verse FOIA litigation involving business records. 
D. The Trade Secrets Act and the FOIA 
One other possible source of protection for businesses that sub-
mitted confidential information to the government was the Trade 
Secrets Act.170 This was a broadly worded criminal statute forbid-
ding government employees and agencies from disclosing certain 
categories of material unless otherwise authorized by law.l7l Ma-
terial protected by the Trade Secrets Act included information 
relating to trade secrets, confidential statistical data, and 
financial materiaP72-information similar to that covered by Ex-
emption Four of the FOIA. Businesses turned to the Trade 
Secrets Act for reinforcement of Exemption Four protection 
under the FOIA, as well as for the protection it offered as an in-
dependent prohibition against disclosure. Since the Trade Secrets 
, •• Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
, •• Id. 
,., United Technologies Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845, 853 (D. Conn. 1979). 
, .. BUl'Toughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
, •• Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 198. 
110 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). The Trade Secrets Act is commonly referred to as § 1905. 
111 Id. 
111 Id. 
1979] REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION 321 
Act and the FOIA could apply to the same material, it was neces-
sary to determine the relationship between the two statutes .. 
1. The Trade Secrets Act as an Exemption Three Statute 
One possible relationship was that the Trade Secrets Act was 
one of the non-disclosure statutes referred to in Exemption Three 
of the FOIA.173 If the Trade Secrets Act did qualify as an Exemp-
tion Three statute, it would significantly reduce disclosure of bus-
iness records which had been obtained by the government. It 
would operate on both exempt and non-exempt materiaI- inde-
pendently of Exemption Four-and block disclosure of any infor-
mation within its purview unless such disclosures were authorized 
by another law.. Both sides of this issue were vigorously 
presented, m with reference made to the legislative history and 
the amended language of Exemption Three. However, up until 
the time of the Chrysler decision, the relationship between the 
Trade Secrets Act and Exemption Three of the FOIA had not 
been clearly defined in the lower federal courts. 
2. The Possibility of an Implied Right of Action for Submitters 
under the Trade Secrets Act 
Even if the Trade Secrets Act did not qualify as an Exemption 
Three statute, it arguably operated as an independent restraint 
on agency disclosure of information. The statute imposed penal-
ties on government employees who disclosed protected informa-
tion unless they could point to another law authorizing disclo-
sure.1711 The statute thus had the potential to provide a vehicle for 
In "This section does not apply to matters that are ... (3) specifically exempted from 
disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute 
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave 
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers 
to particular types of matters to be withheld. . . ." 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1976). See text at notes 58-65, supra . 
... In a decision that appeared shortly after the 1976 amendment of Exemption Three, 
and which made no reference to the changes wrought by the amendment, the court in 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 
U.S. 924 (1977), determined that § 1905 was an Exemption Three statute. [d. at 1203. The 
opposite conclusion was reached in the Eighth Circuit in General Dynamics Corp. v. Mar-
shall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 n.7 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979). 
See also United Technologies Corp. v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845, 851 (D.Conn. 1979); 
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (D.Md.1976). 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). 
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submitters to challenge many agency decisions to disclose.178 
Establishing a private right of action under the Trade Secrets 
Act proved difficult,177 however, since the Supreme Court had set 
up rigorous tests that had to be met before an implied right of 
action would be found. 178 It could be argued that neither the lan-
guage nor the legislative history of the Trade Secrets Act revealed 
congressional intent that a private right of action be implied.179 
Further support for this view could be adduced from the fact that 
the scope of the prohibitions of the Trade Secrets Act were broad 
and the penalties were adequate to achieve congressional objec-
tives.18o Finally, an implied right of action might not be necessary 
since alternate remedies were available if the statute were vio-
lated.18l With uncertainty existing over whether the Trade 
Secrets Act was an Exemption Three statute, and whether a pri-
vate right of action could be implied from the statute, submitters 
remained uncertain as to the best method of utilizing the Trade 
Secrets Act to block disclosure of confidential business 
information. 
178 For examples of the application of § 1905, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744 (D.Md. 1976); Babcock 
& Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
177 Cases in which a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 was not recognized 
include General Dynamics v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and 
remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 
(7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 
918 (1979); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979). 
A decision from which one could infer an implied right of action under § 1905 is Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
178 In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court set out four criteria for deter-
mining whether an implied right of action will be found in a statute: (1) Is the plaintiff one 
of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted? (2) Is there any indication 
of legislative intent to create or deny such a private remedy? (3) Is such a remedy consis-
tent with the underlying legislative purposes or the legislative scheme? (4) Is the cause of 
action traditionally one relegated to state law, in an area basically handled by the states, 
so as to render a federal remedy inappropriate? 422 U.S. at 78. Recent Supreme Court 
cases have emphasized the importance of legislative intent, raising doubts about the exact 
significance of the other three factors of the Cort test. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). 
17. See Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979). 
18. [d. at 244. 
181 Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1188 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See Clement, supra note 
7, at 624-25, for a discussion of congressional views on the adequacy of the remedies under 
the Trade Secrets Act. 
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3. The Scope of the Trade Secrets Act 
Since it was possible for the Trade Secrets Act to interact with 
the FOIA in a number of ways,182 it was important to determine 
precisely what information was encompassed by the prohibitions 
of the criminal statute. Unfortunately, the scope of the Trade 
Secrets Act was unclear, due to the fact that the law was an amal-
gam of three earlier statutes.183 Each of the originial statutes had 
been directed toward a particular agency and had attempted, in a 
slightly different way, to protect information which businesses 
might consider private.18• In the 1948 codification of Title XVIII, 
the three statutes were combined into one provision directed to-
ward all government agencies. The new statute was more expan-
sive than the previous statutes and applied to any officer or em-
ployee of the United States and to any information which 
"concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, 
style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statis-
tical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or ex-
penditures of any person [or] firm. . .. "l8II 
Read literally, the Trade Secrets Act seemed to prohibit the 
disclosure of any information about a business, including its very 
identity.188 Such an interpretation would favor submitters who 
wished to use the non-disclosure statute to bar release of any bus-
iness information they submitted to the government.187 The gov-
.. 2 See text at notes 170-81, supra. 
,.3 Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223, 238 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 216 
(1940»; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 708, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1335 
(1940»; Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, 52 Stat. 8 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 176(b) (1940». 
,.< Clement, supra note 7, at 607-13, presents a thorough discussion of the three stat-
utes that preceded the Trade Secrets Act. One was a revenue act which forbade govern-
ment employees (in particular, revenue agents and collectors) from making unauthorized 
disclosures of two types of information: (1) informaton which an agent obtained because of 
on-site visits; and (2) the amount or source of income, profits, losses and expenditures set 
forth in an income tax return. Another was a Tariff Commission statute that prohibited 
government employees from disclosing trade secrets or processes uncovered during investi-
gations conducted by the Commission. The third statute, originally entitled "Confidential 
Nature of Information Furnished Bureau," provided that information submitted in confi-
dence to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce by individual firms was to be 
held in confidence by the bureau, and to be used for statistical purposes only, in a way 
which protected the individual identities of the companies involved. The three statutes 
were combined as part of a general revision of the Criminal Code (Title XVIII) . 
... 18 U.S.C. §1905 (1976) . 
.. 8 Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1186 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
'.7 Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 3-4, General Dynamics v. Marshall, No. 77-
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ernment, on the other hand, argued that such an interpretation 
was inconsistent with the original three statutes and with the 
principles behind the 1948 recodification of Title XVIII.188 Fur-
ther, such a broad interpretation would undermine the goals of 
the FOIA.18e The views of the two sides were widely divergent, 
and a decision concerning the scope of the Trade Secrets Act 
seemed crucial to an understanding of the effect of the statute on 
the FOIA. 
4. The Meaning of Disclosures "Authorized by Law" under the 
Trade Secrets Act 
If the Trade Secrets Act were found to apply to material con-
tested in a reverse FOIA suit, either through Exemption Three or 
through the application of the statute as an independent prohibi-
tion on disclosure, one further inquiry remained. When could the 
information covered by the Trade Secrets Act be lawfully dis-
closed by an agency on the grounds that such disclosure was "au-
thorized by law?" Prior to the Supreme Court decision in 
Chrysler, several potential sources for such authorization were 
postulated. leo One of the most obvious sources was the FOIA it-
self.lel The reasoning in support of this position was based on the 
underlying purpose of the FOIA. According to this view, since the 
goal of the FOIA was full public access to information, the FOIA 
not only mandated disclosure of non-exempt material but also au-
thorized the discretionary release of exempt material. lei Thus, 
Congress must have intended the statute to authorize agency reg-
ulations governing disclosure of exempt information.leB Such reg-
ulations, backed by the authority of the FOIA, would be "law" 
and would validate disclosure of information even if it were cov-
1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) (on remand). 
188 [d. at 4-5. 
188 See text at note 171, supra. 
18. In General Dynamics v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and 
remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979), and in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 
1200 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 
U.S. 918 (1979), the courts found that regulations promulgated pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301 
- a general statute providing for the promulgation of internal agency regulations - con-
stituted "authorization by law." Validly enacted agency regulations, reasonably related to I 
the Atomic Energy Act were held to provide "authorization by law" in Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 555 F.2d 82, 89, 94 (3d Cir. 1977). 
181 Campbell, supra note 5, at 145. 
1 •• [d. at 150-51. 
18. [d. 
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ered by the Trade Secrets Act.184 
This reasoning was rejected in an early and influential case in 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.181 The court 
noted that the legislative history of the FOIA indicated that the 
Act was simply not to apply to exempt material. 1M As a result, 
reasoned the court, the FOIA could not be relied on to authorize 
regulations governing disclosure of exempt material.l8'7 This hold-
ing was conceptually sound and seemed to be a correct interpreta-
tion of the FOIA. Logically, it was difficult to accept the view that 
the silence of the FOIA regarding exempt material could author-
ize disclosure under the Trade Secrets Act.188 It was difficult to 
see "how regulations could validly authorize more than was in-
tended by the statute itself. "188 
Another possible source of authority, accepted by several 
courts, was 5 U.S.C. §301, a provision authorizing agencies to pro-
mulgate regulations for "the custody, use and preservation of 
[their] records, papers, and property."IOO Both the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits reasoned that since validly promulgated regula-
tions have the force of law, regulations valid under 5 U.S.C. §301 
must satisfy the "authorized by law" requirement of the Trade 
Secrets Act.IOl But to other courts this section clearly applied 
only to basic housekeeping functions, not to disclosure of infor-
mation that might be protected under another statute.IOI To in-
terpret 5 U.S.C. §301 as authorizing disclosure of such confiden-
tial material would be inconsistent with legislative history, stated 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. loa In addition, 
such an interpretation would allow the agencies a great deal of 
,., [d. 
, •• Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
"8 [d. at 942. 
,.7 [d. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150,170 (D.D.C. 1976), 
cert. before judgment denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nat'l Org. of 
Women, D.C. Chapter, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). 
, •• Campbell, supra note 5, at 151. 
... [d. 
200 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). 
201 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200-02 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated 
and remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979); General 
Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 
441- U.S. 919 (1979). 
200 See, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Rumsfeld, 70 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
203 Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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discretion regarding compliance with the Trade Secrets Act, since 
the agencies could, in effect, relieve themselves of legal liability 
for violation of a criminal statute simply by issuing valid house-
keeping regulations under 5 U.S.C. §301.204 A determination by 
the Supreme Court that agency regulations-promulgated under 
the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. §301, or agency enabling acts-could be con-
sidered "authorization by law" for purposes of the Trade Secrets 
Act would greatly enhance the effect of the FOIA disclosure pro-
visions and undermine the protection of confidential business in-
formation provided by the Trade Secrets Act. 
E. Cause of Action for Submitters under the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Although substantial controversy raged over whether a cause of 
action for submitters could be based on the FOIA or on the Trade 
Secrets Act,20I1 more unanimity was found on the question of 
whether submitters could sue under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).2oe Section 10 of the APA establishes that a per-
son adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial re-
view.207 Assuming the submitter to be adversely affected by an 
agency decision to disclose information pursuant to an FOIA re-
quest, redress should be available in the courts. However, even 
though many courts agreed that a cause of action could be based 
on the AP A, they disagreed, at least in practice, on the standard 
of review to be applied when the courts reviewed agency decisions 
under the APA.208 Some courts afforded the submitters de novo 
consideration, while others confined their review to the agency 
record.2oe 
'0' Petitioner's Brief at 43, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
'0' See text at notes 136-43, & 175-81, supra. 
... Clement, supra note 7, at 626. 
'07 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). 
'0. Campbell, supra note 5, at 135. 
'.9 Courts applying de novo review, at least in part, included: Chrysler Corp. v. Schles-
inger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D.Del. 1976), vacated and remanded, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 
1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); 
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 519 F.2d 935, 
940 n.4 (D.C.Cir. 1975). Courts reviewing submitters' claims on the record, applying an 
abuse of discretion standard, included: General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 
1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979) (However, although 
the court states that de novo review is not appropriate, they seem to imply that a review-
ing court will determine for itself whether information falls within one of the nine exemp-
tions. Id.); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1976); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. 
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Since submitters might be limited to review under the AP A, as 
opposed to being granted implied private rights of action under 
the FOIA or the Trade Secrets Act, the issue of scope of review 
was very important. De novo review, in effect, gave submitters a 
second chance. They could introduce additional evidence and at-
tempt to convince the court that the information should not be 
disclosed. In contrast, if review was based on the agency record, 
submitters could not marshal new evidence, including expert tes-
timony, before the court. Furthermore, when review was based on 
the agency record, the standard of review applied would probably 
be a narrow one, and the courts would not substitute their judg-
ment for that agency.210 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision on 
the applicability of the AP A and the appropriate scope of judicial 
review would make a substantial difference in the outcome of re-
verse FOIA suits. 
F. Reverse FOIA Suits: Scope of Review of Agency Decisions 
to Disclose 
The question of scope of review was not confined to suits 
brought under the AP A, but was an important consideration as 
well in suits based on the FOIA and on the Trade Secrets Act. 
Several arguments were raised in favor of de novo review of 
agency action in reverse FOIA suits. The simplest argument was 
that de novo review was available in direct suits, when requesters 
contested agency decisions to withhold information; in fairness, 
such review should also be available to disgruntled submitters.211 
Even more emphatically, some argued that review on the agency 
record was "virtually meaningless,"212 and, certainly insufficient 
to protect the interests of parties who submitted information in 
confidence to the government. us Logically, de novo review also 
made sense since at least one of the issues decided in both direct 
and reverse suits was the same-namely whether the material 
qualified as exempt under the FOIA.214 In support of de novo re-
Consumer Product Safety Comm., 404 F. Supp. 352, 367 (D.De!. 1975). 
210 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) . 
... Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1215 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) . 
... Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 206 . 
... [d . 
... Several courts applied de novo review to this initial question in both direct and re-
verse suits, while refusing to extend de novo review in a reverse suit to the agency's discre-
tionary decision to disclose exempt materia!. In one case, the court noted that since the 
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view submitters also raised the familiar argument that agency 
fact-finding procedures were inadequate, thus necessitating the 
more stringent court review to protect legitimate business 
interests.21& 
De novo review in reverse cases was opposed on several 
grounds. First, while the FOIA specifically provided de novo re-
view to requesters, it did not include similar provisions for sub-
mitters.2l6 This omission was consistent with the fact that the dis-
closure provisions of the AP A had been replaced by the stronger 
disclosure provisions of the FOIA in order to combat agency resis-
tance to disclosure.217 Second , de novo review was available only 
in limited circumstances; in general, courts applied it only: (1) if 
the action was adjudicatory and agency fact-finding procedures 
were inadequate, or (2) if issues that were not before the agency 
were raised in a proceeding to enforce non-adjudicatory agency 
action. 218 Arguably, FOIA suits did not meet these requirements. 
They did not involve formal adjudicatory hearings, the agency 
procedures were not necessarily inadequate, and all issues were 
raised before the agencies. Uti According to this view, submitters' 
arguments that the time was too short for adequate fact finding 
were not convincing. no Although agencies had to determine 
whether to comply with an FOIA request within ten days, this 
time period had been viewed by Congress as sufficient. It was fur-
ther argued that the courts had no greater expertise in evaluating 
FO IA claims than did the agencies. In fact, the agencies were gen-
erally more familiar with the industries they regulated and with 
the type of information usually requested from them/'ll 
A Supreme Court decision that submitters could obtain de novo 
consideration in federal court of agency decisions to disclose 
would serve as a check on the growth of the FOIA as access legis-
first question was whether the information would have been exempt, the district court 
should hold a hearing "just as it would if a suit had been brought under the FOIA to 
compel disclosure." Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) . 
.,. Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 203. 
m 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). 
217 Campbell, supra note 5, at 139. 
m Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971) . 
... Campbell, supra note 5, at 137 . 
••• Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellants at 9-10, General Dynamics Corp. v. 
Marshall, No. 77-1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) (on remand) . 
... [d. at 11. 
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lation. De novo review certainly would involve longer delays in 
the release of information and might well reduce the total amount 
of information released. On the other hand, de novo review would 
reaffirm Congress' original commitment to the protection of pri-
vately submitted information. The proper resolution of these con-
flicting interests awaited the Supreme Court. 
IV. CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN 
The litigation between Chrysler and the government embodied 
most of the major issues in reverse FOIA litigation involving Ex-
emption Four information.222 The case had the potential to re-
solve some of the recurring issues in this type of litigation. 
A. The controversy 
The Chrysler Corporation, as a party to numerous government 
contracts,223 was required by Executive Order 11246224 and by De-
partment of Labor regulations promulgated thereunder221 to com-
ply with the Department of Labor's policy of providing both 
equal employment opportunities and an affirmative action pro-
gram to eliminate discrimination in employment.228 To monitor 
Chrysler's compliance with these policies, the government re-
quired Chrysler to submit information about the composition of 
its work force. 227 In addition, Chrysler's compliance agency,228 the 
Defense Logistics Agency,229 on occasion initiated reviews of 
... See text at notes 104-221, supra . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 (1979) . 
... Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) as amended by Exec. Order No. 
11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967) . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977), citing 41 C.F.R. pt. 
60 . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 (1979). 
"7Id . 
... The Secretary of Labor delegated administrative responsibility for enforcing the ex-
ecutive order to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). 41 C.F.R. 60-1.2 
(1979). The Director of OFCC delegated primary responsibility for monitoring adherence 
to the executive order to various federal agencies. The Defense Logistics Agency (formerly 
the Defense Supply Agency) was assigned to monitor Chrysler's compliance with the La-
bor Department policies. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977) . 
••• The Defense Logistics Agency is an agency of the Department of Defense, under the 
control of an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Its mission is to provide effective and eco-
nomical support to the military services, other Department of Defense components, fed-
eral civil agencies, foreign governments and others, as authorized, for assigned material 
commodities and items of supply, logistics services directly associated with the supply 
management function, contract administration services and other support services. OFFICE 
330 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:299 
Chrysler's employment policies, requiring Chrysler to submit af-
firmative action documents which included details on past and 
projected employment of women and minorities, occupational 
levels of minority personnel, staffing patterns, pay scales, actual 
and expected shifts in employment, promotions, seniority, and re-
lated job matters.230 
As part of its overall policy of combatting employment discrim-
ination, the Department of Labor promulgated regulations pro-
viding for public access to most of the information collected pur-
suant to its compliance programs.231 In fact, the regulations 
provided that such information would ordinarily be released even 
if it were exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA.232 
The major exception was for information, the disclosure of which 
was prohibited by law.233 
In May, 1975, the Defense Logistics Agency, which was follow-
ing Department of Labor regulations covering disclosure of infor-
mation by compliance agencies, informed Chrysler that it had re-
ceived an FOIA request for affirmative action data and for a 
complaint investigation report involving Chrysler's Newark, Dela-
ware assembly plant.234 Despite Chrysler's objection to disclosure, 
the agency decided to release the data.2311 Chrysler immediately 
brought suit in the federal district court for Delaware to enjoin 
the release of the information.236 Chrysler was able to obtain a 
temporary restraining order barring disclosure; when additional 
FOIA requests were received for data from Chrysler's Ham-
tramck, Michigan plant, Chrysler was able to get the order ex-
tended to cover this additional data.237 These temporary re-
straints were extended until the case was heard in district 
court.238 
Chrysler's complaint in the district court raised some of the 
OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN. 
U.S. GOV'T MANUAL 236-39 (1979-80) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 (1979) . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1176-78 (3d Cir. 1977), citing 41 C.F.R. 
60-40.1-40.4 . 
••• Id. at 1177, citing 41 C.F.R. 60-40.2(a) . 
••• Id., citing 41 C.F.R. 60-40.2(b) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 287 (1979) . 
• 3. Id. 
2" Id. at 287-88. 
'.7 I d. at 288 . 
• 38 Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1181 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
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major reverse FOIA issues discussed above. For example, Chrysler 
claimed that disclosure of the data would violate the FOIA, citing 
Exemptions Three, Four, Five and Seven.239 Chrysler also alleged 
that disclosure would violate the Trade Secrets Act. uo Another 
contention was that the agency, in determining what to disclose, 
had abused its discretion since it had acted in violation of its own 
regulations, some of which were almost identical to the Trade 
Secrets Act.241 
B. The District Court Decision 
The first important decision made by the district court was to 
afford Chrysler a trial de novo.242 The second decision was to clas-
sify some of the requested information as falling within the scope 
of Exemption Four.u3 The court applied the National Parks 
test244 and concluded that some of the requested data was (1) 
confidential, in that it was not voluntarily released to anyone and 
was unavailable elsewhere, and (2) that its release was likely to 
cause substantial competitive harm.2411 Expert testimony had been 
adduced to support the contention of competitive harm, and had 
proved to the court's satisfaction that release of the information 
would (a) aid competitors in employee-raiding, (b) aid competi-
tors in determining the use of Chrysler's labor force and the tech-
nology being applied, and (c) over time, allow Chrysler's competi-
tors to reduce their own risk-taking.246 Such information was 
therefore covered by Exemption Four and disclosure was not re-
quired under the FOIA.:Ol47 
Since disclosure was not mandated by the FOIA, the court 
looked tQ the agency's own disclosure regulations248 to see if the 
compliance agency (here the Defense Logistics Agency) could 
••• [d. at 1180 . 
••• [d. For a discussion of the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), see text at 
notes 170-205, supra . 
••• [d. at 1180-81. 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (D.De1.1976), vacated and 
remanded, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. 
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 176 . 
••• See text at notes 159-68, supra . 
••• 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D.Del. 1976) . 
••• [d. at 175-76. 
"7 [d. at 176 . 
• 48 Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1176-78 (3d Cir. 1977), citing 41 C.F.R. 
60-40.1-60-40.4. 
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utilize its discretion to disclose. One of these regulations served to 
extend the prohibitions of the Trade Secrets Act to the agency.24e 
The court then assumed, without argument, that since some of 
the information met the National Parks test for Exemption Four 
material, the information would also be covered by the Trade 
Secrets Act.210 The court concluded that agency disclosure of this 
data violated its own regulations.2Il Having found that the 
agency's decision to disclose certain information was contrary to 
law, the court issued a permanent injunction against disclosure of 
the relevant data.212 
C. The Court of Appeals Decision 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court 
on the question of standard of review, finding that de novo review 
was not necessary.us The court arrived at this decision by con-
cluding that submitters had no private right of action under ei-
ther the FOIA214 or the Trade Secrets Act.ul They buttressed 
their finding of no private right of action under the FOIA by also 
determining that the exemptions were permISSIve, not 
mandatory.2ls Thus, since the action arose under the APA,2G7 the 
district court should simply have determined first, whether the 
agency's discretionary decision to disclose was based on the 
proper legal standards for the applicability of the FOIA exemp-
tions, and second, whether the decision was based on a considera-
tion of the factors set forth in the agency's disclosure regula-
tions.218 Since the court decided that in this case the agency 
record provided an inadequate basis on which to conduct such a 
review, the case was ordered remanded to the agency.2Ge 
The court of appeals found not only that the Trade Secrets Act 
... Id. at 1177, citing 41 C.F.R. 60-40.2(a) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 177 (D. Del. 1976), vacated and 
remanded, Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
'Ol Id . 
••• Id. at 179 . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1192 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
••• I d. at 1185. 
••• I d. at 1188 . 
••• Id. at 1185 . 
• n See text at notes 205-09, supra . 
••• 565 F.2d at 1192 . 
••• Id. 
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did not provide a cause of action, but also that the Trade Secrets 
Act could not be cited as a limit to agency discretion to release, 
since release was authorized by agency regulations. leo These regu-
lations, promulgated under 5 U.S.C. § 301, were held by the court 
to satisfy the provision in the Trade Secrets Act allowing disclo-
sure which is authorized by law.lI8l Having found such authoriza-
tion in agency regulations under 5 U.S.C. § 301, it was unneces-
sary for the court to decide whether the FOIA could also function 
as authorization for the promulgation of regulations which would 
satisfy the Trade Secrets Act requirement. lIell 
D. The Supreme Court and the Issues 
The Supreme Court had before it, when it deliberated on the 
Chrysler case, some of the major questions which frequently arose 
in reverse FOIA litigation. In fact, the Court even had to consider 
the basic issue of whether a "reverse" suit could actually be 
brought under the FOIA by submitters. Some of the issues were 
resolved and their resolution should serve to simplify reverse 
FOIA litigation. Other questions remain open and will give rise to 
continued controversy until they are resolved by judicial or legis-
lative action. 
Of the major issues presented, the Court dealt most conclu-
sively with those involving the FOIA itself. This emphasis was not 
surprising, since these were the issues most fully analyzed in the 
lower courts and debated in Congress in the years prior to 
Chrysler. Nor were the specific holdings on the FOIA issues sur-
prising; they reflected the sounder legal views on these prQblems. 
The Court dealt less decisively with the problems posed by the 
Trade Secrets Act, leaving unresolved questions relating to the 
scope of the Trade Secrets Act and to· its status as an Exemption 
Three statute. lies On the other hand, the Court provided specific 
guidelines for evaluating whether agency regulations can author-
ize disclosure under the Trade Secrets Act, and laid to rest the 
possibility of judicial recognition of an implied private right of 
action under the Trade Secrets Act. The Supreme Court seemed 
to settle the question of scope of judicial review in future cases 
.oo Id. at 1186 . 
••• Id. at 1187-88. See discussion in text at notes 189-205, supra . 
••• Id. 
••• In remanding the case for a consideration of whether the requested information was 
affected by the Trade Secrets Act, the court presented the agency with a formidable task. 
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brought by submitters under the AP A, but may not have done so 
decisively enough to avoid future litigation of the issue. 
1. Issues Resolved 
a. The FOIA Exemptions are Permissive 
The Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether the nine ex-
emptions to the FOIN~64 were permissive or mandatory by hold-
ing that "Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be 
mandatory bars to disclosure. "2811 There was nothing surprising in 
the Court's conclusion or in its reasoning. The Court based its 
decision on the purpose of the FOIA, its language, its logic and its 
legislative history.288 The Court stated, as it had in previous 
cases,287 that the basic purpose of the FOIA was disclosure of a 
broad range of information;288 this objective was exemplified by 
the organization of the FOIA.289 The first section of the Act2'7O 
established the basic duty to disclose; the second sectionl71 
merely set forth that material which was not subject to the re-
quirements of the first section. The second part of the Act simply 
"demarcates the agency's obligation to disclose; it does not fore-
close disclosure."272 The Court found it significant that the FOIA 
very specifically grants jurisdiction to federal courts to enjoin the 
withholding of information, while it does not give similar author-
ity to bar disclosure.2'78 Finally, the Court apparently found more 
compelling those parts of the legislative history supporting the in-
terpretation that the exemptions were only intended to be 
permissive.27• 
The Court's reasoning on the question of mandatory versus 
permissive exemptions was set forth briefly. The Court did not 
attempt to explore the issue in detail, as several lower courts had 
••• See text at notes 55-69, supra . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) . 
... [d. at 291. 
•• 7 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,74 (1973); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 
352, 360-61 (1976) . 
••• 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 291-93 . 
... 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1979). 
m 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1976) . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979) . 
... [d . 
... [d. at 293-94. 
1979] REVERSE FOIA LITIGATION 335 
done,2711 nor did it choose to grapple with the conflicting interpre-
tations which these courts had given to the legislative history of 
the FOIA. Perhaps at the time when the Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue, the appropriate step was simply for the Court to 
acknowledge concisely the viewpoint it found most convincing. 
Although most of this part of the Court's opinion merely con-
cluded a past controversy, the Court did raise two points which 
will deserve more attention in the future. First, the Court noted 
that although Congress was admittedly sensitive to the privacy 
interests of individuals and non-governmental entities, in essence 
"the congressional concern was with the agency's need or prefer-
ence for confidentiality; the FOIA by itself protects the submit-
ters' interest in confidentiality only to the extent that this inter-
est is endorsed by the agency collecting the information. "17. 
Although the importance of agency concerns had been expressed 
before,177 this statement is particularly strong and seemingly ex-
clusive of all other interests. It seems to suggest that not only 
does the agency have discretion in choosing whether or not to dis-
close exempt material, but also that the only test to be used in 
determining disclosure is the agency's need. This suggestion may 
have ramifications for the interpretation of the scope of the nine 
exemptions, especially the scope of Exemption Four.17• 
The second interesting question raised in this part of the 
Court's opinion was whether the Court felt that some further ac-
tion was necessary to resolve the tensions which helped to pro-
duce the controversy over the permissive or mandatory nature of 
the exemptions. The Court acknowledged that "Enlarged access 
to governmental information undoubtedly cuts against the pri-
vacy concerns of nongovernmental entities, and as a matter of 
policy some balancing and accommodation may well be desira-
ble. "178 The Court did not indicate precisely what kind of balanc-
ing or in what form or forum. One possibility is that the Court 
accepted the fact that it was time for the re-balancing to take 
"" Compare National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.Cir. 
1974), with Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979) . 
... See, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C.Cir. 1975); 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767-69 (D.C.Cir. 1974); 
Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 245 (M.D. Fla. 1979) . 
••• See text at notes 144-69, supra . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979). 
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place in the legislature. It does seem to be time for Congress to 
clarify the amount of protection to be affored private business in-
terests by Exemption Four. 
b. No "Reverse" Right of Action under the FOIA 
Once the exemptions were found to be permissive, "It necessa-
rily follows," said the Court, that the FOIA does not provide the 
basis for a right of action to enjoin disclosure of information re-
quested under the statute.280 The loss to submitters of the protec-
tion offered by a right of action under the FOIA is significant. An 
independent right of action gave submitters a chance for de novo 
review of their claims. Furthermore, a right of action under the 
FOIA reaffirmed their belief that the FOIA was a balancing stat-
ute, to which they could look for some protection of their inter-
ests. Even its name - the "reverse" FOIA suit - emphasized the 
dual nature of the Act. However, after Chrysler, in name at least, 
the "reverse" FOIA suit no longer exists. Nonetheless, although 
the statute can no longer be reversed to protect submitters' 
claims, some of the basic issues involved in "reverse" suits will 
continue to be litigated in other forms. 
c. No Private Right of Action under the Trade Secrets Act 
Having rejected Chrysler's argument that it was entitled to 
court review under the FOIA, the Supreme Court addressed 
Chrysler's alternative ground for a right of action- the Trade 
Secrets Act. The Court briefly confirmed the more widely ac-
cepted view that the Trade Secrets Act did not provide a private 
right of action.281 Measuring the Trade Secrets Act against the 
tests set out in Cort v. Ash,282 the Court found no statutory basis 
for inferring a civil cause of action, no legislative intent to create 
one and, most importantly, no need for such a remedy to achieve 
the purpose of the Act since, according to the Court, Chrysler 
could obtain review of the agency decision to disclose under the 
APA.283 The reasoning on this final point was too abbreviated to 
be fully satisfactory. Critics had claimed that the APA did not 
••• [d. at 294 . 
•• , [d. at 316. 
,.2 422 U.S. 66 (1975) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979). 
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provide an adequate remedy;IU it certainly does not offer the 
same degree of protection as that provided by an implied right of 
action under the Trade Secrets Act. In addition, the penalties 
provided under the Trade Secrets Actl811 are minimal compared to 
the competitive harm that might be engendered by violation of 
the statute. According to submitters, minimal monetary damages 
did not compare in effectiveness to injunctive relief preventing 
disclosure.188 
d. Right to Review under the Administrative Procedure Act 
Although submitters were not afforded implied rights of action 
under the FOIAI87 or under the Trade Secrets Act,188 the Court 
found that they were entitled to judicial review of agency action 
under section 10 of the APA.I88 Unfortunately, the scope of re-
view to be afforded under the AP A was not set forth clearly 
enough to qualify it as an issue "resolved" by the Court. 
e. Only Certain Agency Regulations Constitute Authorization by 
Law under the Trade Secrets Act 
The viewpoints expressed prior to Chrysler on the issue of au-
thorization by law under the Trade Secrets Actl" fell short of one 
basic goal of the FOIA-a balancing of interests. As has been 
noted repeatedly, the FOIA is not susceptible of interpretation 
simply as an access statute;181 it also contains provisions for pro-
tecting certain confidential information, particularly trade secrets 
and confidential business information.181 It is doubtful that Con-
gress intended the FOIA to give agencies complete discretion to 
adopt regulations allowing them to ignore similar protections em-
bodied in the Trade Secrets Act. It is stretching the FOIA beyond 
its limits to interpret it as authorization for full disclosure in con-
travention of the Trade Secrets Act. Similarly, regulations 
promulgated under the APA or the agency enabling statute 
... Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 206 . 
••• 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). 
- Petitioner's Brief at 66, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 316 . 
... 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). See text at notes 205-21, supra . 
• 10 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). See text at notes 189-205, supra . 
• " See text at notes 30-55, supra . 
... 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)(1976). 
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should not be interpreted automatically as authorizing disclosure 
of information protected under the Trade Secrets Act. 
Yet it also seems inconsistent with the trend toward greater ac-
cess to government-held information to allow the Trade Secrets 
Act to block completely any disclosure of FOIA-exempt material 
falling within its ambit. The "authorized by law" provision would 
be very limited in scope if no agency regulations were found to be 
valid under it. If this were the case, Congress would have to enact 
a separate statute every time it wished to authorize disclosure of 
information protected by the Trade Secrets Act.1I88 A compromise 
position was needed, one which would accommodate the two' laws, 
the FOIA and the Trade Secrets Act, into a statutory pattern 
consistent with the logic and legislative intent of each. 
The decision in Chrysler seems to be a reasonable attempt at 
such a solution. The Court set out the three basic requirements 
which any agency regulations must meet if they are to constitute 
"authorization by law" under the Trade Secrets Act.1I84 First, they 
must be substantive regulationsll8G- regulations affecting individ-
ual rights and obligations.1I88 One test for substantive regulations 
is whether they have been treated as such by the promulgating 
agency;Z87 if the agency wishes them to be treated as substantive, 
it must promulgate them accordingly.1I88 This test thus leads to 
the second criterion the regulations must meet: they must comply 
with the procedural requirements of the APA for substantive 
rulemaking.1I88 The final criterion for substantive regulations is 
that they be issued pursuant to a statutory grant of authority 
and, in fact, implement that statute.800 There must be a "nexus 
between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite leg-
islative authority by Congress. "801 The test will be "that the' re-
viewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of 
••• Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 441 U.S. 918 (1979) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 301. 
... [d. at 302 . 
•• 7 [d. at 315 . 
••• [d. The procedural requirements for substantive rulemaking are set out in 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(1976) . 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 302-03. 
S., [d. at 304. 
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authority contemplates the regulations issued."302 
The Chrysler decision demonstrated an application of the three 
tests. The regulations on which the government relied in 
Chrysler303 clearly affected individual rights and obligations.3M 
They were thus substantive rules. But the Labor Department it-
self had failed to treat them as such-the regulations had not 
been promulgated in conformity with AP A procedural require-
ments for substantive rulemaking.3011 In light of the agency's fail-
ure to comply with these requirements, the regulations could not 
be afforded the force and effect of law.308 
Procedural defects could quite possibly be cured without diffi-
culty. However, the second deficiency in the regulations relied on 
in Chrysler was more serious. According to the Supreme Court, 
the regulations were not clearly the product of an adequate grant 
of congressional authority.307 Those grants of authority which the 
government offered-the FOIA, Executive Order 11246308 and 5 
U.S.C. §301-were not tied closely enough to the disclosure regu-
lations to bestow upon them the force and effect of law under the 
Trade Secrets Act.309 
First, the court rejected the FOIA as statutory authority for 
promulgating regulations to disclose exempt material.310 Materials 
exempt from the FOIA are "outside the ambit of that ~ct 
.... "311 Second, Executive Order 11246, which was designed to 
help end discrimination in employment, was also found to be an 
8.. [d. at 308. 
8.3 The regulations on which the government primarily relied, 41 C.F.R. 60-40.1-40.4 
(1977), provided for disclosure of information in the records of the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance regardless of whether the information was exempt under the FOIA. The 
major qualification was that disclosure not impede the functions of the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance and the compliance agencies, and not be prohibited by law. Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 287 (1979). 
304 [d. at 303. 
8 •• [d. at 312. 
3.6 [d. at 313. 
3.7 Id. at 303-04, 307-08, 309. 
3.6 Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 
11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14304 (1967). These executive orders are designed to help eliminate 
discrimination in employment by the federal government and government contractors. 
They require the Secretary of Labor to ensure that government contractors provide equal 
employment opportunities regardless of race, creed, color, national origin and sex, and to 
promulgate regulations necessary to achieve these goals. 
3.0 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 307-08, 309 (1979). 
31. [d. at 303-04. 
3" [d. at 303. 
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insufficient statutory basis for the regulations. S12 The Court was 
not deterred by the fact that the origins of congressional author-
ity for the order were unclear; the regulations would not reasona-
bly be within the contemplation of any of the potential statutory 
grants of authority offered for the executive order.s18 Further-
more, the Court felt that the disclosure regulations relied on were 
not tightly tied to the purposes of the executive order.s14 The or-
der was designed to deal with employment discrimination, while 
the regulations dealt with access to information.s11 Finally, the 
Supreme Court similarly found that 5 U.S.C. §301 could not func-
tion as an adequate grant of statutory authority,818 since this pro-
vision was simply a housekeeping provision and not intended to 
provide authority for limiting the scope of the Trade Secrets 
Act.sU 
The nexus test elucidated by the Court preserved the vitality of 
the Trade Secrets Act and ensured that its prohibitions will con-
tinue to affect disclosures under the FOIA.818 While a decision 
that any valid agency regulations constitute sufficient authoriza-
tion would have simplified the area of reverse FOIA suits and 
promoted greater disclosure, it would have rendered oddly inef-
fective a statute designed to influence agency action. The better 
way to simplify this area of litigation is to have Congress clarify, 
by le'gislation, the relationship between the FOIA and the Trade 
Secrets Act. 
In its disposition of the Chrysler case, the Supreme Court re-
solved several major issues. The Court conclusively established 
that the exemptions to the FOIA are permissive. After Chrysler, 
when an agency receives an FOIA request for business informa-
tion, it must make two preliminary determinations; (1) Is the in-
formation exempt from mandatory disclosure under Exemption 
Four? (2) If the information is exempt, should the agency, after 
... Id. at 307-08 . 
... Id. at 306. 
"4 Id. at 307 . 
... Id . 
.. 8 Id. at 309 . 
• 17 Id. 
818 However, the test enunciated by the Supreme Court was flexible enough for two 
courts to find, pursuant to the decision in Chrysler, that certain agency regulations could 
authorize disclosure of information encompassed by the Trade Secrets Act. See Cedars 
Nursing & Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. 
Pa. 1979); Brookwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1979). 
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weighing competing interests, exercise its discretion to disclose? 
According to the Chrysler decision, once these initial determina-
tions are made, the agency must also consider whether the Ex-
emption Four material is covered by the Trade Secrets Act. If it 
is, agency discretion is limited. The information cannot be dis-
closed unless the agency can find sufficient "authorization by 
law". According to the Supreme Court, agency regulations will 
not constitute such authorization unless they meet the criteria set 
out in Chrysler: (1) that they are substantive regulations, (2) that 
they have been promulgated according to AP A procedures for 
substantive rulemaking, and (3) that they have been issued pur-
suant to a satisfactory statutory grant of authority. Regulations 
promulgated under the FOIA, Executive Order 11246 and 5 
U.S.C. §301, will not suffice. The Court also determined that the 
agency's decision to disclose can be challenged by submitters, but 
only under the provisions of the APA. Submitters have no im-
plied right of action under the FOIA or under the Trade Secrets 
Act. As a result of this finding, the scope of review of agency ac-
tion will probably be limited to the agency record, and the stan-, 
dard applied by the reviewing court will probably be narrow. 
The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court decision and 
remanded the case so that "the Court of Appeals may consider 
whether the contemplated disclosures would violate the prohibi-
tions of § 1905."818 After receiving briefs from both parties on 
these issues, the court of appeals remanded the case to the dis-
trict court, directing the lower court to order the relevant agen-
cies to make new determinations of whether § 1905 applied to the 
information and whether the Trade Secrets Act qualified as an 
Exemption Three statute.820 Chrysler's petition for rehearing in 
the court of appeals was denied, and the case is currently at the 
agency level. 821 
2. Issues Remaining after Chrysler 
a. The Scope of Exemption Four 
The Chrysler decision left unanswered two related questions 
... Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318-19 (1979) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, Nos. 76-1970 & 76-2238 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1979) (judgment 
on remand) . 
•• , Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, Nos. 76-1970 & 76-2238 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 1979) (petition for 
rehearing denied). 
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concerning the business records exemption: the narrow question 
of its applicability to the data requested from Chrysler, and the 
broader question of the scope of the exemption. 
The district court, by applying the National Parks test,322 
found some of the contested information to be within Exemption 
Four.S23 Chrysler showed, to the court's satisfaction, that certain 
data was confidential and that release of the data could cause 
substantial competitive harm.324 This finding was not altered on 
appeal; the court of appeals simply assumed for purposes of argu-
ment that the material in question was exempt, and did not ex-
pressly decide the issue.8u The Supreme Court did not "attempt 
to determine the relative ambits of Exemption 4 and § 1905 
.... "828 Since the case has been remanded to the agency,327 an 
initial decision will most likely be whether the material sought is 
indeed covered by Exemption Four. Presumably the National 
Parks criteria will be applied. Although this test for exempt ma-
terial poses problems for both submitters and agencies, it should 
continue to form the basis for determining the scope of Exemp-
tion Four. 
Before Chrysler, the National Parks test was subjected to 
strenuous criticism by submitters. These criticisms were ably 
summarized by two attorneys828 active in reverse FOIA litigation. 
According to these attorneys, "the D.C. Circuit's interpretation 
effectively nullifie[d] the protection for private business records 
that Congress intended."uB The common meaning of "confiden-
tial," these critics said, was information "subjectively intended to 
be imparted in confidence . . ." not just information that would 
••• See text at notes 159-69, supra . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D.Del. 1976), vacated and re-
manded, 565 F. 2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
••• Chrysler successfully argued that access to the information would enable competitors 
to raid minority employees, to determine Chrysler's use of its labor force and its technol-
ogy at the plants, and to reduce their own risk-taking over a number of years. Chrysler 
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976), vacated and remanded, 565 F. 
2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281 (1979) . 
••• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 n.49 (1979) . 
••• [d. at 319. 
317 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, Nos. 76-1970 & 76-2238 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1979) (judgment 
on remand) . 
... Thomas Patten and Kenneth Weinstein, members of the District of Columbia bar . 
••• Patten & Weinstein, supra note 23, at 195. 
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necessarily cause competitive harm.33o They also pointed out that 
Congress did not necessarily equate the disadvantages that follow 
from disclosure of business information with probable harm to a 
corporation's competitive position.331 Another criticism voiced 
was that the process of protecting business records from disclo-
sure, including proof of competitive harm, was difficult and 
costly.332 Furthermore, the submitter might not be familiar with 
all facets of its competitor's business and might not in fact know 
whether some information would be useful or not.333 Finally, criti-
cism was based on equitable grounds. According to this view, it 
was basically unfair for one company to utilize techniques or ap-
proaches which another had developed through the expenditure 
of time and money, regardless of whether it redounded to the 
competitor's benefit at the expense of the submitter.334 
Just as businesses found flaws in the National Parks test, so 
agencies may not wholeheartedly look forward to applying such a 
test at the agency level. The test will result in practical problems. 
Establishing the likelihood of substantial harm will take time, 
and may require written documentation and perhaps even expert 
testimony.8311 Difficult questions of proof may arise, since without 
access to the information sought, requesters may be unable to re-
fute the arguments of the submitters.886 
Despite these criticisms and anticipated problems, the Na-
tional Parks test should continue to be applied unless Congress 
re-defines the scope of Exemption Four337 and "its relationship 
••• [d. at 196 (footnote omitted). 
331 [d. at 198 . 
••• [d. at 194 . 
••• [d. at 199 . 
••• [d. To correct these problems, a modification of the National Parks text was recom-
mended. First, business records would be evaluated as to whether or not they were the 
kind of information usually held in confidence; if so, they were covered by Exemption 
Four. However, if the exemptions were permissive, the agency would still be able to decide 
whether or not to disclose the information by weighing the public interest in such records 
against the confidential interest of the corporation. [d. at 201-02. In contrast, National 
Parks "precludes an effective balancing of interests by setting the Exemption 4 standards 
so high that most data [would] never reach the interest-balancing stage." [d. at 202 . 
••• See note 164, supra . 
••• Campbell, supra note 5, at 197. 
'.7 Senator Dole has recently introduced a bill which, in amending the FOIA, would 
significantly extend the scope of Exemption Four. S. 2397, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo 
REC. 2317 (1980). The proposed amendment is reminiscent of the expectation of confiden-
tiality test (supra note 152); it would protect proprietary information not customarily dis-
closed to the public by the party from whom it was obtained. The same criticism can be 
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with the Trade Secrets Act. First, although the National Parks 
test may not always operate to protect fully the interests claimed 
by businesses which submit data, it is the best test which has 
been articulated so far and is an improvement over the earlier 
formulations.33s The earlier tests, which allowed businesses to de-
termine the standards for nondisclosure by a subjective or reason-
able business practice test,339 eliminated the balancing that is 
necessary in FOIA matters: the public interest in access to infor-
mation was not represented.340 Efforts to return to these earlier 
formulations should be resisted. Second, the National Parks test 
reflects the competing interests which Congress originally at-
tempted to balance. It reflects congressional concern that, in pro-
viding access to information, the FOIA might cause private busi-
nesses to suffer competitive harm.341 Third, the test has gained 
acceptance in many courts,342 and perhaps even in Congress.343 In 
gaining fairly widespread acceptance, it seems to represent the 
current view of the equitable approach to a balance of interests 
under Exemption Four. 
Since the test is the best version to date of the balancing prin-
ciple involved in Exemption Four controversies, the protection 
the test offers for submitters should not be cut back by agencies. 
The temptation to give agencies blanket authority to disclose at 
their discretion should be resisted. Just as the business commu-
nity should not set its own standards for disclosure, so the agen-
cies should not be allowed to consider only their mission. Agency 
raised against the amendment as was raised against the expectation of confidentiality test. 
The submitting party would, in large measure, control the release of information. "Cus-
tom" would be the measure of disclosure rather than indentifiable harm to a party's com-
petitive position. 
338 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 21. 
339 See text at notes 150-58, supra. 
'40 Supplemental Reply Brief for the Appellants at 16, General Dynamics Corp. v. Mar-
shall, No. 77-1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) (on remand). 
341 The legislative history dealing with the trade secret exemption and with concern for 
competitive harm is discussed in National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 
765, 766-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
342 See American Airlines Inc. v. National Mediation Board, 588 F.2d 863, 871 (2d Cir. 
1978); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Westchester Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 
245 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Save the Dolphins v. Department of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407, 
412 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
34. See H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976); S. REP. No. 1178, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976). 
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mission is one interest to be advanced,344 but business interests 
must also be respected. If not, one of the two interests which were 
considered when the FOIA was passed, and which currently co-
exist, albeit uneasily, within the statute, will cease to be ade-
quately represented. 
Although the National Parks test should be retained, certain 
modifications in agency procedures can be adopted to facilitate its 
application at the agency level. For example, agencies should be 
allowed more time for initial consideration of requests for infor-
mation.3411 Although this may require amendment of the FOIA 346 
and may be a step backwards in terms of eliminating time delays 
in receiving material,347 it should avoid the even longer delays 
which attend extensive litigation.348 Agencies should also be en-
couraged to set up procedures for notifying submitters of pending 
requests349 and for requesting initial classification of material 
3 .. u.s. Dep't of Justice, Statement concerning the Supreme Court's Decision in 
Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at 6 (June 15, 1979). 
34. Agencies are currently required to respond to an FOIA request within ten days. An 
extension of the time limit is available if: (1) the records are not at the office processing 
the request; (2) a voluminous number of records are requested; or (3) it is necessary to 
consult with another agency that has a substantial interest in the documents. 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(6)(B)(1976). These justifications are not designed to accommodate the kind of in-
vestigations required when Exemption Four interests are involved. One other possibility 
remains: the government might be given an extension if it can show "exceptional circum-
stances" and "due diligence" on the part of the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976) . 
• ,. The government notes that the ten day time limit does not apply to material that is 
exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Supplemental Reply Brief for the 
Appellants at 10, General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, no. 77-1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) 
(on remand) . 
• n The House committee studying the business records exemption and reverse suits did 
not consider it advisable to amend the FOIA time limit. However, the committee acknowl-
edged that if the procedures they recommended proved inadequate to eliminate the recur-
ring problems in this area, it would reconsider extending or restructuring the time limits 
in cases involving business records. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 53 . 
• ,. The documents originally requested in the Chrysler controversy were a 1974 affirma-
tive action plan and the report of a 1974 complaint investigation. Disclosure of the docu-
ments was scheduled for June, 1975. The Supreme Court handed down its decision in the 
case in 1979, and in 1980, the case is on remand to the agency. See text at notes 319-21, 
supra. Similarly, requests for employment data from several major insurance companies 
were made in 1975, and the ensuing dispute was brought into district court. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. before judgment denied sub 
nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. National Org. for Women, D.C. Chapter, 431 U.S. 
924 (1977). After denial of certiorari, the case was appealed to the circuit court but oral 
argument stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler. Campbell, supra note 
5, at 110-13. As these examples demonstrate, the length of time between an FOIA request 
and final receipt of the documents can be considerable. 
3" 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31. 
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from submitters.3110 In appropriate circumstances, agencies should 
be allowed to make categorical decisions about some kinds of in-
formation, with appeal available.3111 Agencies should also be re-
quired to institute realistic administrative appeal procedures for 
submitters. SII2 To have any practical impact, these appeals should 
be decided before release of the contested information. 
b. The Trade Secrets Act and Exemption Three 
The Supreme Court did not determine whether the Trade 
Secrets Act qualified as an Exemption Three statute. SII3 Subse-
quent to Chrysler, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
seemed to assume that Exemption Three did apply in a case in-
volving the Trade Secrets Act.sM However, no opinion was issued 
elucidating the reasons for that court's decision. A similar conclu-
sion was reached by the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia which concluded that the Trade Secrets Act qualified as 
an Exemption Three statute. Slill The court found that § 1905 
meets both tests set out in Exemption Three: first, it is non-dis-
cretionary in that it is a criminal statute, and second, it refers to 
specific matters to be withheld. SII6 These cases should probably be 
appealed, and the issue litigated further. Based on an analysis of 
its legislative history, language and the total legislative scheme of 
which it is a part, the sounder result seems to be a determination 
that the Trade Secrets Act is not an Exemption Three statute. 
In the early years of the FOIA, questions arose as to which laws 
were intended to be covered by Exemption Three. SII7 Although de-
cisive answers were unavailable, the Trade Secrets Act was cited 
by both the executive31i8 and judicialsII9 branches as the type of 
3 •• Id. at 34. 
3 •• Id. at 40-46. The committee reviewed the experiences of several agencies in utilizing 
disclosure rules and class determinations and concluded that, in limited circumstances, 
such methods facilitated the handling of claims. However, the use of such procedures 
should not be viewed as a panacea. 
3.' Clement, supra note 7, at 637. 
3.3 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 nA9 (1979). 
3 •• Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marshall, No. 75-1491 (D.D.C., Nov. 29, 1979 and Dec. 11, 1979) 
(orders granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and injunction). 
3 •• Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 21 FAIR EMP. PRAC. (BNA) 1455 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
3'. Id. at 1461. 
.., See, e.g., FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schles-
inger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). See text at notes 59-
65, supra. 
3 •• (1967) Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the 
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statute covered by the exemption. The first Supreme Court dis-
cussion of Exemption Three gave the provision a broad reach.180 
Finding the parameters of the exemption to be unclear, the Court 
looked to legislative history.181 Although Exemption Three re-
ferred to information "specifically exempted . . . by statute 
. . . "182 the Court did not place too much emphasis on the word 
"specific." According to the Court, Congress was aware that ex-
isting confidentiality statutes varied in the specificity with which 
they directed information to be withheld.181 To demand that Ex-
emption Three statutes name specific documents or describe par-
ticular catagories would unrealistically assume that Congress had 
reassessed all previous statutes.184 Furthermore, reasoned the 
Court, Congress had continued to oversee the FOIA and had 
amended the Act in 1974 without changing Exemption Three.181 
As if in response to the Court's argument, Congress, in 1976, 
changed the wording of the exemption.188 The legislative history 
of this amendment reveals an intention to overrule the Supreme 
Court decision construing Exemption Three;187 unfortunately, the 
history did not clearly reveal whether the amended exemption 
was intended to apply to the Trade Secrets Act.18s Although ref-
erence was made in the House to the fact that the Trade Secrets 
Act was not intended to be an Exemption Three statute,188 the 
final congressional intention is difficult to ascertain.170 However, 
the stronger historical arguments favor the view that the Trade 
Secrets Act is not within the scope of Exemption Three. 
Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 263, 300 (1968) . 
••• Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. 
Supp. 796, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Although the district court found the contested infor-
mation not to be within the Trade Secrets Act, it seemed to assume that the Trade Secrets 
Act was an Exemption Three Statute. Id . 
• 8. FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975). 
'81 Id. at 262 . 
• 8. q U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1970). 
'8' FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 265 (1975) . 
• 8. Id . 
• 8. Id. at 267 . 
• 88 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247(1976) 
(codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(1976» . 
• 87 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976), reprinted in (1976) U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2244, 2250 . 
• 88 Campbell, supra note 5, at 146-47 . 
• 8. H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in (1976) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2183, 2205 . 
• 70 Campbell, supra note 5, at 148. 
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Consequently, subsequent to the 1976 amendments, judicial in-
terpretations tended to exclude the Trade Secrets Act from Ex-
emption Three coverage.3'1l For example, a district court in Flor-
ida stated conclusively that "As a direct result of the 1976 
amendment of Exemption 3,. . . general, discretionary nondisclo-
sure statutes, like 18 U.S.C. § 1905 [the Trade Secrets Act], no 
longer qualify as the kind of statute to withhold information in 
disregard of the liberal disclosure requirements of the FOIA."371 
The language of the amended exemption places more emphasis 
on specificity, and demands that an Exemption Three statute ei-
ther (1) require that matters be withheld from the public in such 
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue or (2) establish 
particular criteria for withholding or refer to particular types of 
matters to be withheld.3'13 Arguments can be made, albeit with 
some difficulty, that the Trade Secrets Act meets these two crite-
ria. One way to fit the Trade Secrets Act under the amended lan-
guage is to argue that the statute on its face allows the agency no 
discretion.374 The Trade Secrets Act prohibits disclosure of a long 
list of information-unless such disclosure is authorized by law. 
The agency's task under the statute is simple: if protected infor-
mation were requested, it would have to be withheld unless the 
agency located another statute authorizing disclosure. Agency dis-
cretion is not involved. In fact, one could argue that since the 
Trade Secrets Act is a criminal statute, "it can have no discre-
tionary element."376 A second way to fit the Trade Secrets Act 
under the Exemption Three language is to argue that the law es-
tablished a list of particular matters to be withheld.37• 
Once again, however, the stronger arguments seem to fallon 
the side of excluding the Trade Secrets Act from Exemption 
Three status. The Trade Secrets Act's broad sweep seems to be 
incompatible with congressional intent to narrow the scope of ex-
371 See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 n.7 (8th Cir. 
1978), vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 
464 F. Supp. 236, 242-43 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. 
Supp. 736, 742-43 (D. Md. 1978); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 
744, 752 (D.Md. 1976). 
n. Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 242 (M.D. Fla. 1979). 
a.a 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). 
a.. Clement, supra note 7, at 605. 
a.1 Petitioner's Brief at 58, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
a •• Id. 
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empt material. 377 Most important, the effects of construing Ex-
emption Three to include the Trade Secrets Act are inconsistent 
with the policy embodied in the FOIA. The goal of increasing the 
flow of information between the government and the people 
should not be curtailed so drastically by imposing restrictions on 
both FOIA-exempt and non-exempt information falling under the 
Trade Secrets Act. Adequate protection can be given to private 
interests by considering the Trade Secrets Act in conjunction 
with information protected by Exemption Four. Although the leg-
islative history relating to the scope of the Trade Secrets Act is 
ambiguous, if interpreted reasonably, its goals can be effectuated 
through application of the Exemption Four National Parks test. 
c. The Scope of the Trade Secrets Act 
The Supreme Court did not determine the scope of the Trade 
Secrets Act in the Chrysler decision.378 This issue will continue to 
play an important role in FOIA litigation, operating in the follow-
ing way. If requested information falls into Exemption Four, the 
agency will have to decide whether or not to release the data. 379 
Its discretion will be circumscribed by the Trade Secrets Act, a 
law which may apply independently to Exemption Four informa-
tion and prohibit its disclosure.38o Therefore, the agency will have 
to determine whether the information is covered by the Trade 
Secrets Act.381 If the scope of the Trade Secrets Act is broad, it 
will arguably prohibit disclosure of any information within Ex-
emption Four unless disclosure is authorized by law.382 Submit-
ters will, in effect, have achieved a mandatory interpretation of 
Exemption Four,383 subject of course to the Trade Secrets Act 
loophole of "authorization by law." On the other hand, if the 
377 Campbell, supra note 5, at 154. 
37. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 319 n.49 (1979) . 
• 7. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Babcock to Agency General Counsels on 
Current and Future Litigation under Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281(1979), at 5 
(June 21, 1979) . 
•• 0 [d. at 7 . 
•• , [d. at 6. 
,.2 See text at notes 189-205, supra . 
•• 3 A truly mandatory construction of Exemption Four would be achieved by the pas-
sage of the proposed amendment to the FOIA. Under S. 2397, Exemption Four material 
would be released only if the submitter consented or failed to object, or if the agency could 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that withholding would "seriously injure an 
overriding public interest." S. 2397, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGo REC. 2317 (1980). The 
likelihood of an agency attempting to meet, and meeting such a burden, seems slight. 
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scope of the Trade Secrets Act is limited to that information cov-
ered by its three predecessor statutes,884 an agency holding re-
quested infoI:mation will be able to use its discretion in releasing 
Exemption Four data which does not deal with (1) trade secrets, 
(2) highly private information normally found on income tax re-
turns, or (3) commercial information submitted in confidence and 
likely to cause competitive harm.8811 
Unfortunately, an analysis of the language and legislative his-
tory of the Trade Secrets Act is not conclusive in determining 
which interpretation has more merit. The language of the present 
statute, as noted above,888 is very broad and could, on its face, 
prevent the government from releasing most of the business infor-
mation it receives. On the one hand, it seems unlikely that in 
combining the three statutes in 1948, Congress intended a more 
sweeping prohibition on disclosure of business data submitted to 
the government than had existed previously.887 On the other 
hand, it is not clear that the logical way to determine the current 
scope of the Trade Secrets Act is to limit it precisely to the infor~ 
mation covered in the nineteenth century Revenue, Tariff and 
Commerce Acts. 
The three original statutes were directed toward three particu-
lar agencies;888 thus, the information they were designed to pro-
tect would naturally be limited to information pertinent to these 
agencies. In contrast, the Trade Secrets Act was intended to ap-
ply to all agencies of the federal government,888 and the scope of 
the material intended to be covered might well have been larger 
than that covered by the three original statutes. The rationales 
behind the three statutes were the familiar ones of protecting 
confidential business information required to be submitted to the 
government and of protecting information so that companies 
would voluntarily submit such information.880 These rationales 
... See footnote 183, supra . 
... Supplementary Brief for Appellants at 2, General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, No. 
77-1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) (on remand) . 
... See text at notes 185-87, supra . 
... Supplementary Brief for Appellants at 3-7, General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, No. 
77-1192 (8th Cir. Sept. 1979) (on remand). 
... See note 183, supra . 
••• [d. 
800 When the Revenue Act was re-enacted in the Tariff Act of 1894, chi 349, § 34, 28 
Stat. 509, 557-58, the Senate debates anticipated a theme heard later in debates over the 
FOIA-the tension between the government's need for information and the privacy rights 
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can also support a broad reading of the Trade Secrets Act. Fi-
nally, the effect of the codification of these three statutes can also 
be interpreted in two ways. The Supreme Court has pointed out 
that in interpreting the 1948 codification, the original intent of 
Congress is to be preserved.391 Unless there was a clear indication 
to the contrary, the codification was not intended to make sub-
stantive changes in the law.392 Thus it can be argued that the cov-
erage of the Trade Secrets Act should be limited to the scope of 
the three predecessor statutes.393 On the other hand, it can be 
contended that the original intention of the statutes-the protec-
tion of confidential business information-is retained if the Trade 
Secrets Act is ,given a broad interpretation. The number of fed-
eral agencies, together with the complexity and sheer bulk of the 
information they acquire, arguably makes such a broad reading 
necessary. 
An analysis of the legislative history of the Trade Secrets Act 
seems inconclusive in terms of the scope of protected material. 
This is not surprising, of course, since the Trade Secrets Act was 
not enacted by a Congress which was aware of any potential con-
flicts with the FOIA. A more direct and useful approach to inter-
preting the statute seems to be an analysis of the Trade Secrets 
Act in light of the subsequent passage of the FOIA. This ap-
proach seems legitimate since both statutes operate in the same 
conceptual area of law. They need to be interpreted in reference 
to each other in order to effectuate a uniform national policy re-
garding access to business information in the hands of the 
government. 
The FOIA, as previously noted, was designed to balance inter-
ests-to disclose as much information as possible without causing 
substantial harm to those who submit information to the govern-
ment. Inherent in the Act were the limits imposed by the nine 
exemptions. The Trade Secrets Act can be read as anticipating 
of individuals and corporations. Clement, supra note 3, at 609-10. Similarly, the Senate 
debates over an amendment to the Tariff Commission statute (Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 
§ 335 46 Stat. 590, 701) expressed concern over: (1) whether manufacturers would disclose 
information willingly, and in detail, if there were no safeguards against disclosure by the 
Commission; and (2) whether the government would be able to honor its promises of confi-
dentiality. 71 CONGo REC. 4561-70 (1929) . 
•• , Muniz V. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975) . 
••• [d. at 474. See also U.S. V. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262 (1966) . 
••• Supplemental Brief for the Defendants-Appellees at 5, Chrysler Corp. V. Brown, Nos. 
76-1970 and 76-2238 (3d Cir. Aug. 1979) (on remand). 
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one of these limits-Exemption Four. The scope of the Trade 
Secrets Act clearly should not go beyond that of Exemption Four, 
as such an e:x:pansive reading would undermine the strong con-
gressional commitment to freedom of information. However, the 
scope of the Trade Secrets Act should not be interpreted as being 
significantly narrower. The limits of Exemption Four have been 
carefully set in the COUrts.88• To meet the criteria of the National 
Parks test, the release of "confidential" information must pose a 
threat of substantial competitive harm.885 If this test is applied 
stringently, the information protected would seem to be the type 
Congress envisioned protecting when it enacted the Trade Secrets 
Act.886 It should also be noted that equating' the reaches of Ex-
emption Four and the Trade Secrets Act will not prohibit the dis-
closure of all Exemption Four material. Such material can be dis-
closed if "authorized by law," as that term is interpreted in 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 887 
The Chrysler decision effectively cuts back on protection for 
private business interests in three substantial ways: in determin-
ing that the FOIA exemptions are permissive; in denying a cause 
of action under the FOIA and under the Trade Secrets Act; and 
in denying de novo review in most reverse FOIA cases. Protection 
will be cut back even further if the Trade Secrets Act is deter-
mined not to be an Exemption Three statute. To avoid com-
pletely upsetting the balance of interests, the Trade Secrets Act 
should be interpreted as being coextensive with Exemption Four. 
If the protection offered by the Trade Secrets Act and Exemption 
Four is to be further reduced, it should be done pursuant to con-
gressional re-evaluation of the competing interest involved. 
d. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions to Disclose 
The Supreme Court seemed to conclude that court review for 
submitters challenging disclosure of business records was availa-
ble only through the AP A and based on only the agency record.886 
The Court stated simply: "De novo review by the District Court is 
ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a contemplated disclo-
••• National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir. 1974). 
See text at notes 144-69, supra . 
••• Id. 
... See text at notes 389-93, supra. 
307 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-316 (1979) . 
••• Id. at 317-19. 
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sure runs afoul of § 1905 [the Trade Secrets Act]."B99 As the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the decision, Chrysler 
"left undisturbed our holding that review of decisions by Federal 
agencies to comply with Freedom of Information Act requests was 
available only under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
702 (1976) and on the agency record."400 Although to some extent 
the issue of scope of review may seem to be resolved, certain 
questions remain,401 and certain developments in agency proce-
dures and court review are to be expected. 
The Agency decision-making procedures will probably become 
more time consuming and extensive, with written, if not oral, tes-
timony from both parties.402 There will be an increased emphasis 
by the agencies on compiling adequate records. Following the 
Chrysler decision, with its finding that the Trade Secrets Act 
places substantive limits on agency action,40B The Department of 
Justice sought remand of pending reverse FOIA cases to create 
new administrative records: "Only through the careful re-creation 
of the administrative process for these pending cases can [the 
agencies] maximize our future ability to defend all such 'reverse' 
cases successfully in the wake of Chrysler."404 The record contem-
plated by the Department of Justice includes evidence from the 
requester, "detailed written objections" from the submitter, and a 
"full explanation and documentation of all reasons" which led to 
the agency decision.406 This explanation will presumably contain: 
... [d. at 318. 
0 •• Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, Nos. 76-1970 & 76-2238 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 1979) (opinion on 
remand) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
0., For example, though the Supreme Court's decision seems to reserve de novo review 
for extraordinary cases, such review seemed to be routinely afforded plaintiffs in a reverse 
FOIA suit appearing after Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. A district court in Virginia concluded 
as a matter of law that the Court's determination of the applicability of § 1905 and of 
Exemptions Three and Four should be made de novo. Burroughs Corp. v. Brown, 21 FAIR 
EMP. PRAC. (BNA) 1455, 1460 (E.D. Va. 1980). Further clarification of the appropriate 
scope of review is necessary either through amendment (as in the proposed amendment to 
the FOIA, S. 2397, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Congo Rec. 2317 (1980), or through judicial 
interpretation. 
0.2 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Babcock to Agency General Counsels on 
Current and Future Litigation under Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at 3-8 
(June 21, 1979). 
0.3 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-18 (1979). 
0.0 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Babcock to Agency General Counsels on 
Current and Future Litigation under Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at 2-3 
(June 21, 1979). 
0.0 [d. at 3. 
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first, documentation of the use of the National Parks test to de-
termine whether Exemption 4 applies; second, reference to the 
factors weighed in determining whether to disclose Exemption 
Four material; third, a discussion of whether the agency felt con-
strained by the Trade Secrets Act;408 and fourth, identification of 
the source of any "authorization by law" used by the agency to 
justify disclosure of information covered by the Trade Secrets 
Act.407 In their efforts to compile a thorough record, agencies may 
und~rtake proceedings which have the accoutrements of formal 
adjudicatory hearings. As a result, the courts may subject the pro-
cess to the substantial evidence test. 408 Furt~ermore, where the 
proceedings take on the character of an adjudication, and where 
fact-finding procedures are arguably inadequate, submitters may 
again seek de novo review under section 706(2)(F) of the AP A.408 
Although the Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility of 
de novo review, in limited circumstances, of an agency determina-
tion about the applicability of the Trade Secrets Act,410 most 
courts will probably base their review on the agency record. The 
basic standard of review will be the abuse of discretion standard 
outlined in the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 411 Thus, in trying to see if agency 
action was "arbitrary and capricious," a court will first determine 
whether the agency was acting within the scope of its authority.411l 
Second, it will determine whether the agency action was "arbi-
trary or capricious" by considering whether the decision was 
based on relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of 
judgment.418 Finally, it will ascertain whether the agency con-
formed to procedural requirements.414 Although the inquiry into 
the facts will be "searching and careful,"411i presumably the court 
.oe Id. at 5 . 
•• 7 Id. at 6. 
'.8 Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the court looks at both sides of 
the evidence in the agency record. The court then determines whether a reasonable mind 
would find this evidence adequate to support the agency conclusion. Universal Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) . 
... 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F)(1976). 
410 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979) . 
... 401 U.S. 402 (1971) . 
... Id. at 415 . 
... Id. at 416 . 
... Id. at 417 . 
... Id. at 416. 
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will not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.OIl 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the Supreme Court faced some of 
the major issues presented in "reverse" suits filed under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA). These issues reflected the basic 
tensions underlying the FOIA: the desire to increase public access 
to documents held by the government and the desire to maintain 
some form of protection for confidential information. The Su-
preme Court resolved the main problems involving interpretation 
of the FOIA. The Court determined (1) that the FOIA exemp-
tions are permissive, not mandatory, (2) that the FOIA does not 
supply submitters with a "reverse" cause of action, and (3) that 
submitters can seek review of agency disclosure decisions under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). The Court also found 
that the Trade Secrets Act does not provide submitters with an 
implied right of action. One other issue involving the Trade 
Secrets Act which the Court resolved was the type of agency regu-
lations needed to constitute "authorization by law" under the 
Trade Secrets Act. To have the force and effect of law in this 
particular context, agency regulations must be substantive, must 
be promulgated according to AP A requirements for substantive 
regulations, and must have the requisite "nexus" with a statutory 
grant of authority. 
The Supreme Court did not comment on the scope of Exemp-
tion Four, apparently leaving intact for the present the National 
Parks test. The Court also did not answer a number of crucial 
questions regarding the Trade Secrets Act. The scope of the 
Trade Secrets Act remains unclear, as does its status as an Ex-
emption Three statute. These issues will be crucial in subsequent 
litigation. However, according to the Court, the scope of review in 
future litigation will ordinarily be limited to review based on the 
agency record. 
In sum, although the answers to some questions were given, 
some of the most troublesome problems remain. "Reverse" FOIA 
litigation, eliminated in name only, will continue to cause exces-
sive expenditures of time and money and will continue to leave 
submitters dissatisfied with the uncertainity surrounding protec-
tion of confidential. business records. Absent congressional action, 
"8 Id. 
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another Supreme Court decision is needed to supply the missing 
answers. 
